Introduction
This analysis has been compiled following a broad based consultative process in which one hundred and twenty-six (126) organisations that include but are not limited to civil society organisations (CSOs) and community based organisations (CBOs) that are working on varying mandates in Zimbabwe. It is a response to the intention by the Parliament of Zimbabwe to institute further process to effect amendments to the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act 2013. This position provides an overview of the proposed amendments, summary of each section of the amendment, a brief analysis and recommendations on the way forward.

On 17 December 2019 Cabinet approved the formulation of the Constitutional Amendment (No.2)-H.B.23, 2019 that would amend several provisions of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. The Bill was published in a Government Gazette Extraordinary on 31 December 2019. The Bill was published again on 17 January 2020 to correct the anomaly which had occurred in the initial publication where the clerk and not the speaker had gazetted the Bill contrary to the Constitution. The Bill proposes amendments to provisions relating to these broad thematic areas;

1) Judiciary: Appointment of judges to the superior courts, retirement ages of judges;
2) Prosecution: Appointment and removal of the Prosecutor General;
3) Election processes: Removal of running mate provisions, extension of proportional representation provisions for female parliamentarians, proportional representation of youths in parliament;
4) Composition of executive: Number of unelected ministers that can be appointed;
5) Legislative oversight role: Oversight and approval of agreements

The endorsing organisations are extremely concerned at the rapid amendment of several provisions of the Constitution since its adoption following a constitutional referendum that was held in March 2013. During this process, the Constitution was voted for by an overwhelming majority of Zimbabweans. Instead of fully aligning all the laws with the Constitution, or ensuring its full implementation, the executive has been leading efforts to amend provisions of the Constitution.

Although the Constitution is the supreme law (highest law) in Zimbabwe, over the last seven years, we remain concerned that the government has;

- Not fully implemented all of its provisions, particularly a number of self-executing clauses in the Constitution that do not have a budgetary implication for implementation, but just require state actors and institutions to comply with the provisions. Other provisions require the government to take action such as establishing institutions that support democracy.
- There has been selective application of some provisions, and non-compliance with constitutional provisions in some instances.
- Implementation of other provisions remains such as those requiring the government to introduce new laws, reform existing state institutions.
- Not fully aligning all subordinate laws and all policies with the Constitution;

Instead, there have been moves to amend the provisions of the Constitution. The current proposal is to amend 27 provisions of the Constitution. However;
1. Some of the provisions proposed to be amended have not yet been tested (the election of vice Presidents, the metropolitan councils)

2. Proposed amendments being introduced, address issues that can be covered in other ways. The proposal to extend the women’s quota system could be addressed by the Zimbabwe Election Commission fully implementing provisions of the Constitution on gender equality as provided in the National Objectives chapter, or through an amendment to the Electoral Act to fully align electoral laws and regulations with the Constitution. Extending the quota system for another two terms of parliament is a temporary strategy. The same legislative and administration measures could be taken to safeguard youth participation. The delimitation provisions could simply be addressed by aligning the Census and Statistics Act with the Constitution.

3. The proposed provisions seek to consolidate executive powers, and will erode some existing checks and balances currently provided for, resulting in the centralisation of power in the President.

4. The proposed provisions are an affront to participatory democracy. They seek to limit the power of the electorate and the public to participate in certain processes such as the election of Vice presidents and appointment of Judges

The table below considers each clause in the Bill against the provisions of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe which it seeks to amend. It also considers whether the proposed amendments are necessary and ascertain if the issues can be resolved through other legal reform measures.

The analysis also assesses if the proposed amendments are indeed reasonably justifiable in a democratic society or undermine the objectives as set out in the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause in Bill</th>
<th>Summary of Provisions</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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| **Clauses 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8**  
*(Sections 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97 & 101)* | These clauses remove the provisions that relate to election of Vice Presidents, or that tie the assumption of office of the Vice President, the terms of office of Vice Presidents to that of the President (sections 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97 & 101 of the Constitution). The current Constitution provides that during an election for the President, the two Vice Presidents who will form part of the presidium team shall also be elected by registered voters. | The election of the President and the two Vice Presidents at the same election or ‘running mate’ model set out in section 92 of the 2013 Constitution has the following advantages;  
- It ensures certainty in succession issues in the event of the death of the President. The model provides continuity in instances where the President is incapacitated, in such cases there is no need for an election.  
- As elected officials the Vice Presidents must be accountable to those that elected them – in this case the Vice Presidents are accountable to the people who have elected them into office, they are not accountable to some appointing authority.  
- Election of Vice Presidents also ensures that there is public participation in the appointment of the presidium team and removes dominance of role of President in choosing the presidium team as the President and Vice President(s) are all elected into office.  
- As elected officials, the Vice President(s) have security of tenure and constitutional protection from unlawful dismissals, undue influence and control by the President. Malawi and Zambia are amongst some countries in the region that have the running mate provision. The proposed amendments seek to restore the position that prevailed in the Lancaster House Constitution when the President-elect had all the power to appoint the two Vice Presidents on his own. |
| **Clause 9**  
*(New Section)* | In the event that the President dies, resigns or is incapacitated the ruling political party from which the President was elected will nominate his successor within 90 days and provide the name to the Speaker of Parliament. | According to the proposed amendment, in the event of resignation, death or incapacitation of the President, the ruling party has power to nominate a President to take over for the rest of the term. If the President becomes incapacitated a few days after being elected into office, this means that a person appointed by the ruling party, who does not have the mandate of the people (not having been elected into office) will take over for the rest of the Presidential term. This clause is undemocratic as it seeks to usurp the will of the majority of the people who would have elected a particular President into office who can be replaced by an unelected President appointed by the ruling party. This is unacceptable because it strikes at the core of the democratic principle voting for the leader of choice to govern a country. |
| **Clause 10**  
*(Section 104)* | The President can appoint up to 7 (instead of 5) additional Ministers from outside Parliament. | The current provisions allow the President to appoint 5 Ministers from outside parliament. It is not clear what criteria will be used to choose the additional 2 Ministers and there really is no justification on whether this is necessary. |
Since these are executive appointments, solely made by the President there is no guarantee that these appointments will be based on need, or motivated by the experience and expertise of those to be appointed. This can be open to abuse as this process does not require any transparency. Further this provision will simply increase the number of cabinet ministers thereby increasing expenditure of government.

**Clause 11**  
*(Section 124)*  
This clause extends the provisions of the party-list women members of the National Assembly by an additional two Parliaments (from 2 to 4 Parliaments), and makes provision for the party-list representation of youths in the National Assembly.

On the face of it, the extension of the quota for women by two more terms may appear to be progressive for attaining women representation. However, this does not ensure robust participation of women in electoral processes. It may also limit the number of women who participate in competitive elected positions. The Constitution already had several provisions that call on the government to take measures to ensure that there is gender equality. These provisions must be fully implemented. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission may also through subsidiary legislation introduce provisions to compel political parties to ensure that women are given equal opportunities to participate in electoral processes.

Amending the Constitution to introduce ten extra seats in the National Assembly reserved for youths is not necessary. While it appears to increase youth representation in parliament, it increases the number of parliamentarians to unsustainable levels. This will further strain the national treasury and result in a bloated Parliament. There are other alternatives to facilitate youth participation in politics, this can be done by ensuring that party lists on a national level include a significant number of youths. Therefore, the inclusion of youths could easily be achieved by requiring political parties to reserve a certain number of seats for youths. ZEC can include this requirement on a percentage of seats that must be occupied by youth through regulations or an amendment to the Electoral Act.

**Clause 12**  
*(Section 161)*  
This clause seeks to de-link the delimitation process from the national census. It removes the need to conduct delimitation as soon as possible after a population census.

The process of ensuring that the timing of the census is conducted in good time for the information and data to be used for delimitation purposes can be easily achieved through other legislative reforms. One option is to align the Census and Statistics Act with the Constitution to ensure that population census is conducted during a convenient time that is appropriate to enable ZEC to make use of the information gathered from the population census as a guideline for electoral boundaries. Although ZEC is supposed to do continuous voter registration, the data from a population census can be used to verify the accuracy of ZEC records as there is no guarantee that updates to the voters’ roll will be provided promptly by those affected. ZEC’s delimitation process can be guided by the census results that will be a reflection of population trends in the various provinces and districts at that particular time. Other countries where it is a requirement for delimitation of boundaries to be linked to population density and trends include Zambia.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Clause 13</th>
<th>This clause will allow the President acting on the recommendation of the JSC to appoint sitting judges to vacancies that may arise in the higher courts, without subjecting them to the public interview procedure.</th>
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| (Section 180) | Section 180 (2) (c) of the current Constitution prescribes public interviews for prospective candidates who wish to be appointed as judges of superior courts. The proposal for the President to appoint judges to the superior courts after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is problematic as it;  
  - Completely removes the present safeguards that ensure that judges will be appointed following a public interview process that is transparent and subject to public scrutiny.  
  - Takes the country back to the Lancaster House Constitution provisions when judges were appointed and promoted following an opaque process.  
  Presently, section 180 provides for the appointment of judges to higher courts provided that the appointment process;  
  - Is merit-based and conducted transparently.  
  - Public interviews allow for greater public participation, debate and scrutiny.  
  - Removal of public interviews and the procedure will inevitably undermine public confidence in the appointment of judges.  
  - Section 180 is in line with best practices from other jurisdictions in the SADC region and beyond, particularly the need to have a standardised, transparent judicial appointment process that ensures public confidence and enhances integrity.  

Several guidelines and principles have been developed that include the Lilongwe Principles and Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Judicial Officers adopted in October 2018 by the Southern Africa Chief Justices Forum. These principles encourage a judicial appointment process of judges that is transparent. The Lilongwe Principles and Guidelines were developed as a standard best practice to find African solutions to address African governance challenges. The principles emphasise the need to have a standardised, transparent process that ensures public confidence and enhances the integrity of the process. The Commonwealth also developed the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Accountability of and the Relationship of the Three Branches of Government. According to these principles and guidelines, in order to uphold the rule of law and dispense justice, the judiciary must be independent, impartial, honest and competent and this can only be achieved if the appointment process identifies people with those qualities. The criteria for judicial office should be informed by the fundamental objectives of equality of opportunity, appointment on merit and the need to address gender inequity and other historic factors of discrimination in the context of their particular society. Leaving the appointment of judges to higher courts by the President acting on the recommendation of the JSC does not guarantee that this will be a publicly declared process that will be done on clearly defined criteria. |
The proposed amendment undermines independence of the judiciary. Zimbabwean government has an obligation to ensure that “Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives as provided in the terms of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.

Other countries in the region do not prescribe in their Constitutions the finer details of the procedures to be followed in shortlisting judges, this process is provided in subsidiary legislation. However, in Zimbabwe, there is no guarantee that if the appointment process is removed from the Constitution, it will be included in other relevant acts.

The current provisions of the Constitution create a safeguard as constitutional provisions should not be easily amended, particularly given that the Constitution was promulgated following an overwhelming majority referendum.

In order to uphold the rule of law and dispense justice, the judiciary must be ‘independent, impartial, honest and competent’. The objective of judicial appointment processes should be to provide a reliable means of identifying persons who possess these qualities and to do so in a manner that is legitimate and transparent, in order to sustain public confidence in the judiciary.

Appointment of judges to higher courts should take place without favour or prejudice and without politics and inappropriate influence playing a part.

Provisions on the appointment of judges to higher courts must not be amended.
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<tr>
<th>Clause 14</th>
<th>This clause will allow Judges of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court to extend their tenure after reaching the age of 70 annually for up to 5 years, subject to a favourable medical report as to the mental and physical fitness of the judge so as to continue in office.</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Section 186)</td>
<td>Section 186 of the current Constitution imposes a mandatory age of retirement for Constitutional Court and Supreme Court Judges at 70. In other jurisdictions the retirement age of Constitutional Court judges has also been set at 70 years, this is the case in South Africa, which also provides for the possible extension of the term of office based on an Act of Parliament. Having the terms of office set in the Constitution or other legislation creates security of tenure for the judiciary. It lessens the risks to judicial officers when holding influential individuals and government bodies to account and insulates judges from external pressure. The challenge with this proposed amendment is that, although the President extends the term of office after consultation with the JSC, the President does not appear to be bound by the recommendations of the JSC. This clause should be repealed to avoid conflict of interest, which eventually leads to the corrosion of judicial independence and ultimately, the rule of law.</td>
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<td>Clause 15</td>
<td>This clause rewords the functions of the Public Service (previously called the Civil Service) These amendments could have been made in subsidiary legislation. They are not sufficiently important to include in a Constitutional amendment.</td>
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<td>(Section 199)</td>
<td>From an administrative perspective there is need to have clarity of roles. The office of the Chief Secretary exists <em>de facto</em> and not <em>de jure</em>. Its role in execution is not clear hence can be a source of conflict with the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. This area may require further engagement. Following the idea of the proposed engagement, these amendments can be made in subsidiary legislation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clause 16</td>
<td>This clause provides for the appointment and role of the Chief Secretary to the Office of the President and Cabinet and his or her deputies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(New section)</td>
<td>From an administrative perspective there is need to have clarity of roles. The office of the Chief Secretary exists <em>de facto</em> and not <em>de jure</em>. Its role in execution is not clear hence can be a source of conflict with the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. This area may require further engagement. Following the idea of the proposed engagement, these amendments can be made in subsidiary legislation.</td>
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| **Clauses 17 and 18**  
**Section 243** | These clauses create the office of the Public Protector, who will take over certain functions concerning public maladministration, etc, from the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission | The office of the Public Protector is not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. It was in existence prior to the 2013 Constitution as the Office of the Ombudsman and then it was renamed to be the office of the Public Protector. Its mandate was derived from the Public Protector Act [Chapter 10:18] which was later repealed.  
During its existence, members of the public could approach the body with complaints of maladministration in public institutions for investigation. The complaints related to unjust administrative action they suffered at the hands of administrative officials. The mandate was very broad and the investigations extended to any Ministry or department of Government and any member of such Ministry or department; any local authority; any hospital, clinic, school or training institute controlled directly or indirectly by the State; any statutory body and any authority empowered to determine the person with whom any contract or class of contracts are to be entered into by or on behalf of the State. The Public Protector would take remedial steps.  
Although the creation of the office of the Public Protector is important in dealing with issues of cases of administrative injustice, the proposed provisions limit the scope of the issues the new office will investigate to those concerned with any Ministry or department, or any member of such Ministry or department; and such other persons or authorities as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament.  
This provision also empowers the Public Protector to carry out certain functions of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) including investigating conduct relating to the violation of human rights and freedoms set out in the Constitution.  
This proposed amendment creates the following challenges:  
- It allows the Public Protector to encroach on the competency of the ZHRC and amounts to a duplication of roles between the two independent institutions.  
- The problem of multiplicity of institutions arises as was the case in the past. There is no need for the creation of the public protector office that has been shown.  
The recommendation is not to create the office at this juncture given limited resources but to strengthen the already existing Chapter 12 independent Commissions. Strengthening the existing institutions instead of proliferating institutions of accountability is ideal. Including establishing those already provided for by the Constitution that are outstanding such as the Independent Complaints Mechanism. |
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<tr>
<th>Clause 19</th>
<th>This clause will provide for the appointment of the Prosecutor-General by the President on the advice of the JSC, without the intervention of a public interview procedure, and makes special provision for his or her removal for cause by a Tribunal.</th>
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</table>
| (Section 259) | This provision dispenses with the need to have public interviews in the appointment of the Prosecutor General. Under the Constitution, the appointment process of a Prosecutor General is similar to the procedure of a judge.  

The current appointment process promotes accountability and transparency. The process ensures that there is scrutiny, and increases public confidence in the office of the Prosecutor General who is appointed based on merit. Removal of the public process as contemplated by the amendment is a threat to Prosecutorial Independence, an important facet of the rule of law. The Prosecutor General must be seen to act independently and not subject to the direction or control of any person.  

Removal of such processes opens the appointment process to abuse where appointments are politically motivated instead of being merit based. It restores the provisions that were in the Lancaster House Constitution.  

This provision should be removed.  

It reverts to the old position before the Constitution where the appointment process was shrouded in secrecy and the Attorney General who was also responsible for prosecution was appointed by the President. |
<table>
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<th>Clauses 20, 21, 22 and 25</th>
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<td><strong>(Sections 268 &amp; 269)</strong></td>
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These clauses remove elected members of Parliament from the membership of provincial councils, merge the provisions relating to provincial and metropolitan councils by removing the special provisions relating to the latter (they would no longer be chaired by mayors, but be elected in terms of section 272 like provincial councils), and provide for the election of 10 of the members of Metropolitan Councils by a system of party-list proportional representation.

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<tr>
<th>These clauses seek to remove Members of Parliament from the governance of provincial councils by adopting a system of party-list proportional representation.</th>
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Proportional representation will enhance ruling party dominance in all provincial councils. This will undermine democracy as the constituencies will be denied the opportunity of directly electing leaders in the provincial councils, therefore, undoing the will of the people as it will be taking the country back to the old Constitution.

Members of Parliament are already administering the Constituency Development Fund. Whilst some may argue that if Members of Parliament (MPs) become members of Provincial and Metropolitan Councils it defeats the principle of separation of powers. The very fact that MPs are already administering funds from the Consolidated Revenue Fund means that this issue is not a priority in any way.

In addition the purpose of Devolution is to give autonomy to lower tiers of government. Past experiences have shown that Ministers can overpower local authorities and give directives on local authority operations. The only arm of the state that can check on excesses of the Executive is the Legislature. Members of Parliament are the only ones who can give semi-autonomy operations of lower tiers of government. Having them in the Provincial and Metropolitan Councils creates genuine semi-autonomy operations.
| **Clause 23**  
| *(Section 327)*  |
| This clause uses the defined term “international organisations” in subsection (3)(a) instead of “foreign organisations or entities”, which term is undefined in the Constitution. |

The removal of the term ‘foreign organisations or entities’ from section 327 seeks to limit the types of agreements or treaties that must be approved by Parliament to become part of Zimbabwean law.

The role of Parliament is to play an oversight role over executive functions and taking away agreements with foreign organisations or entities beyond the scrutiny of Parliament defeats the principle of separation of powers, public accountability and good governance. Presently, all agreements made between the Zimbabwean government and international organisations (defined as consisting of two or more independent states) as well as foreign organisations and entities must be approved by Parliament before they become binding. In most cases international agreements imposing fiscal obligations on a country come in the form of loan agreements.

The current provision allows for Parliament to exercise its oversight role on the Executive, especially in instances where agreements that have a fiscal or other serious implication on the welfare of the country are entered into by the Executive. Clause 23 appears to be meant to put beyond parliamentary scrutiny financing agreements or loans between Zimbabwe and foreign credit banks or other financial entities.

The adverse effect in this context would be that Zimbabwe would potentially be bound to foreign debt from foreign agreements as the system would have been extensively weakened by a severe lack of checks and balances. Parliamentary approval of agreements that impose fiscal obligations on the state is one way of enhancing accountability through the oversight function of Parliament. Without any parliamentary oversight and approval of agreements that impose fiscal obligations on the country, Zimbabwe might further fall into a debt trap drawn from secretive projects that may include punitive repayment terms, certain immunities or exemptions to foreign companies.
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<tr>
<th>Clause 24</th>
<th>This clause repeals the definition of “Civil Service” and replaces it with a definition of “Public Service”.</th>
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<td>(Section 332)</td>
<td>There appears to be some confusion in these amendments. For instance, section 199 is not amended but it is the founding provision relating to the ‘Civil Service’ (it has not been amended to ‘Public Service’). Also 11.(1) of the Savings Provision Interpretation of existing enactments, Part 4, Savings And Transitional Provisions, still provides “Unless inconsistent with the context, a reference in any existing enactment to-(d) the Public Service must be construed as a reference to the Civil Service; (e) the Public Service Commission must be construed as a reference to the Civil Service Commission;” However, it should be the other way round if these amendments are seeking consolidation of terms and protections in all legislation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clause 27</td>
<td>This clause provides for minor amendments to the Constitution (mainly the substitution of references to the “Civil Service” or “Civil Service Commission” by references to the “Public Service” and “Public Service Commission”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Schedule)</td>
<td>As provided above.</td>
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**ENDORSED BY THE FOLLOWING:**

1. #Whispers
2. Abamelli Human Rights Lawyers
3. Act4Women
4. Advocates 4 Earth
5. Africa Community Publishing & Development Trust (ACPDT)
6. Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe
7. Amnesty International
8. Artists for Democracy Trust
9. ASAP
10. Basilwizi
11. Bulawayo Vendors and Traders Association (BVTA)
12. CAT - ZIM
13. CATHOLIC Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP)
14. Centre for Community Development Zimbabwe
15. Centre for Democracy and Peace Advocacy (CDPA)
16. Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA)
17. Centre for Natural Resources Governance
18. Chitungwiza and Manyame Rural Residents Associations
19. Chitungwiza Progressive Residents Associations
20. Chitungwiza Residents & Ratepayers Associations
21. Chitungwiza Residents Association
22. Christian Legal Society (CLS)
23. Citizens Health Watch
24. Civic Education Network Trust
25. Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA)
26. Community Water Alliance
27. Counselling Services Unit (CSU)
28. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition
29. Community Youth Development Trust (CYDT)
30. Ecumenical Support Services
31. Election Resource Centre (ERC)
32. Emtonjeni Women’s Forum (EWF)
33. Epworth Residents Association
34. Federation of African Media Women in Zimbabwe
35. Female Students Network
36. Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ)
37. Girl Child Empowerment Zimbabwe
38. Gweru East Taxpayers and Residents Association
39. Harare Metropolitan Residents Forum
40. Heal Zimbabwe
41. Hwange Residents Association
42. ICOD
43. Institute of Public Policy Analysis and Implementation (IPPAI)
44. Institute for Young Women’s Development (IYWD)
45. International Commission for Jurists (ICJ)
46. International Revolutionary League
47. Japa Edutaiment Trust
48. Jekesa Pfungwa Vulinqondo
49. Justice for Children
50. Katswe Sistahood
51. Labour Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ)
52. Law Society of Zimbabwe
53. Legal Resources Foundation (LRF)
54. Masvingo Residents Trust
55. Masvingo United Residents and Ratepayers Association
56. Media Alliance of Zimbabwe (MAZ)
57. Media Centre
58. Media Institute of Southern Africa Zimbabwe (MISA Zimbabwe)
59. Media Monitoring Project in Zimbabwe
60. Media Monitors
61. Mission to Live
62. Msasa Project
63. National Association of Non Government Organisations
64. National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped
65. National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe (NCDPZ)
66. National Informal Economy Workers’ Union of Zimbabwe (NIEWZ)
67. National Movement of Catholic Students
68. National Youth Development Trust (NYDT)
69. New Thinking Development
70. Nhimbe Trust
71. Non Violent Action for Social Change
72. Norton Residents Alliance
73. Padare
74. Patsimeredu Edutainment Trust
75. Platform for Youth Development (PYD)
76. Plumtree Development Trust
77. Progressive Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ)
78. Radio Dialogue
79. RUCET
80. Ruwa Residents and Ratepayers Association
81. Savanna trust
82. Saywhat
83. Self Help Development Foundation
84. Silveira House
85. South Western Region Gender Network (SWRGN)
86. Southern African Parliamentary Support Trust (SAPST)
87. Student Christian Movement in Zimbabwe
88. Students Solidarity Trust
89. Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ)
90. Uhuru Network
91. Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe (VMCZ)
92. Women Academy for Leadership and Political Excellence (WALPE)
93. Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA)
94. Women in Politics Support Unit (WiPSU)
95. Women's Coalition of Zimbabwe (WCoZ)
96. Women's Community Development Trust
97. Women's Institute for Leadership & Development (WILD)
98. Youth Alliance for Democracy Trust
99. Youth Dialogue Action Network (YODAN)
100. Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT)
101. Youth Environmental Management and Protection Trust
102. Youth Forum
103. Zimbabwe Association of Community Radio Stations (ZACRAS)
104. Zimbabwe Christian Alliance
105. Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET)
106. Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
107. Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC)
108. Zimbabwe Democracy Institute
109. Zimbabwe Editors Forum
110. Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association (ZELA)
111. Zimbabwe Farmers Union Development Trust
112. Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZIMRIGHTS)
113. Zimbabwe Institute (ZI)
114. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)
115. Zimbabwe National Editors Forum (Zinef)
116. Zimbabwe National Students Union
117. Zimbabwe Organisation for Youth in Politics
118. Zimbabwe Pastors Forum
119. Zimbabwe Poets for Human Rights
120. Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ)
121. Zimbabwe United Residents Association
122. Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA)
123. Zimbabwe Women Resource Centre & Network (ZWRCN)
124. Zimbabwe Young Women's Network for Peace building (ZYWNP)
125. Zimbabwe Youth Movement (ZYM)
126. ZIMCODD

/ENDS/