



## BRIEFING PAPER #111

# THE EU'S CLEAN INDUSTRIAL DEAL: A STRATEGY FOR SOME OR FOR ALL?

The European Commission's Communication on the Clean Industrial Deal (CID) outlines the EU's new strategy for boosting the competitiveness of European industry while reducing its carbon emissions. Positioned as the successor to the European Green Deal, the landmark initiative of the EU's 2019-2024 mandate that set out a path to climate neutrality by 2050, the CID marks a new phase in Europe's green transition.

However, critical questions remain: who will benefit from this strategy and its proposed measures? Will the CID genuinely foster a just green transition, both within Europe and in partner countries?

This SOLIDAR briefing paper provides a concise overview of the Commission's Communication and critically examines its potential to deliver a just transition for all. Furthermore, it proposes a set of policy recommendations aimed at strengthening the social and international dimensions of the CID, thereby ensuring a fairer and more impactful strategy.





# I. DECONSTRUCTING THE CLEAN INDUSTRIAL DEAL COMMUNICATION

The European Commission's [Communication on the Clean Industrial Deal](#) (CID), published on 26 February 2025 and first announced in von der Leyen's Political Guidelines of July 2024, addresses the pressing challenges facing the EU and especially its industry. These include geopolitical uncertainty, unfair international competition, the climate crisis and growing social inequalities - all factors that, according to the Communication, increase the demand for security, stability and growth. The CID is the von der Leyen Commission's strategic response to these challenges.

Framed as a **transformative business plan** designed to forge a resilient, competitive and decarbonised European economy, the CID aims to reduce industrial dependence on fossil fuels while accelerating the adoption of "clean" technologies that contribute to sustainability and environmental protection. Central to this strategy is the recognition that **long-term competitiveness and decarbonisation** can be mutually reinforcing and should form the basis of the EU's economic model.

To guide this transformation, the Commission outlines **six key business drivers**:



## 1. Access to affordable energy

Ensuring access to affordable energy for businesses and households is a crucial part of the decarbonisation process. To support this, on the same day as the CID, the Commission presented an [Action Plan for Affordable Energy](#), which focuses on reducing energy costs for all, completing the [Energy Union strategy](#), attracting investment and ensuring

resilience to potential energy crises. While the CID Communication focuses primarily on the impact of the Action Plan on industry, some of the proposed initiatives also have a social dimension. Measures to address affordability, for example, could benefit the households most affected by the energy crisis. However, most of the other affordability measures announced in the CID are aimed at reducing energy costs for industry, either by reducing the cost of purchasing (clean) energy or by increasing the supply of energy, with no specific measures targeted at households.



## 2. Lead markets

The EU wants to create favourable conditions for markets where "Made in Europe" products that are clean, i.e. have a minimum environmental impact throughout their life cycle, can thrive. This involves both stimulating demand (ensuring that buyers are willing and able to buy clean products) and stimulating supply (helping industries to produce these products competitively). However, the Communication does not address the social dimension or the potential impact of such measures.

The main tool to increase demand for clean EU products will be the **Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act**, to be presented in the last quarter of 2025. This Act will introduce **resilience and sustainability criteria**, including **social and environmental standards**, together with European preference requirements, in both public and private procurement processes in strategic sectors. In addition, the Commission proposes to include similar criteria in EU public procurement through a revision of the Public Procurement Directives scheduled for the end of 2026. In another section of the Communication, the Commission also proposes to extend these criteria to foreign investment in order to "tighten up" the rules and safeguard the EU's



economic security. This will be done through the ongoing review of the EU's Foreign Direct Investment Regulation and the Guidelines on Foreign Subsidies Regulation, expected in the first quarter of 2026.

### 3. Major investments

To finance the clean transition, the Commission intends to leverage both public and private investment. To increase public funding at EU level, the CID will mobilise **over €100 billion in the short term** to support innovative projects and technologies focused on reducing emissions. In the post-2027 EU budget (MFF), a new **Competitiveness Fund** will provide support for sustainable investment in innovative industries and offer a simplified, one-stop access to EU funding. There is no reference to the allocation of funds for social objectives and a just transition.

In terms of **support at national level**, the CID will introduce a new Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework in the second quarter of 2025, which will aim to simplify state aid rules as long as the aid is used to further the CID's objectives. **Tax policy** will also play a crucial role in achieving the CID's objectives by ensuring that fossil fuels are not favoured over clean energy. The Commission will recommend that Member States adopt tax incentives to support clean business practices and will work to phase out fossil fuel subsidies.

The CID refers to InvestEU as the EU's main instrument for leveraging **private investment**. The Commission has already **proposed to amend the InvestEU Regulation** to increase its risk-bearing capacity, which will help mobilise an additional €50 billion, building on the more than €280 billion already mobilised. This funding will support key EU priorities, including clean technologies, industrial modernisation, energy infrastructure and clean mobility.

### 4. Circularity and access to materials

The EU aims to strengthen its circular economy to improve the affordability and accessibility of essential materials, while reducing dependence on unreliable suppliers and potential supply disruptions. Key tools to achieve this include the rapid implementation of the **Critical Raw Materials Act** and the adoption of a **Circular Economy Act**, scheduled for the last quarter of 2026. This Act will promote the free movement of recycled products and materials, increase recycling and reduce the cost of raw materials. Once again, however, there is no mention of the social implications of these measures.

### 5. Global markets and international partnerships

The CID relies heavily on international partnerships to achieve its objectives, especially as many critical raw materials essential for the clean transition are sourced outside the EU. As part of the CID, the Commission will establish **Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships** (CTIPs) with partner countries to manage strategic dependencies, secure the EU's position in key global value chains and ensure that European companies have better access to raw materials, clean energy and clean technology, while also promoting cooperation on energy technologies and clean transition policies and supporting decarbonisation efforts in partner countries. Negotiations on the first CTIP with South Africa were launched in March 2025, and a trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation initiative will be launched under the Pact for the Mediterranean to boost renewable energy investments in the Mediterranean region.

Building on the "simplification" efforts of the **First Omnibus Package**, which was released in February 2025 and revises key corporate sustainability



directives and regulations, the Commission intends to review the **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism** (CBAM) to enhance its effectiveness and reduce administrative burdens while still providing an incentive for global carbon pricing. A review report in late 2025 will assess the extension of the CBAM to more sectors, indirect emissions and risks of circumvention. This will be followed by a legislative proposal in the first quarter of 2026. Finally, to protect EU industries from unfair competition, the CID makes clear reference to the use of Trade Defence Instruments and announces the adoption of Guidelines on Foreign Subsidies Regulation in 2026, as previously mentioned.

## 6. Support for skills and workers in the transition

In the 6th and final driver, the CID commits to a **just transition** that benefits all, creating quality jobs and empowering people through skills development, while promoting social cohesion and equity. According to the Commission, a successful clean transition requires building a skilled workforce and attractive job opportunities to draw top talent.

On 5 March 2025, the Commission launched the **Union of Skills** strategy to equip people with the skills, knowledge and competences they need for life, including to meet industry demands and strengthen Europe's competitiveness. Key priorities include investment, adult and lifelong learning, vocational education and training, higher education, skills retention and streamlining skill recognition processes. The strategy also aims to attract and integrate skilled talent from partner countries through a Skills Portability Initiative planned for 2026. The Commission will review the EU's sectoral skills initiatives to align them with strategic industries, supported by an additional **€90 million from Erasmus+**.

The Commission also stresses the importance of creating quality jobs to attract and retain a skilled workforce. To support this, a **Quality Jobs Roadmap** will be presented at the end of 2025 to help Member States and industries ensure decent working conditions, high health and safety standards, access to training, fair job transitions and collective bargaining. It will also **support workers** by providing a framework for managing restructuring processes at EU and national level, focusing on just transition, proactive adaptation to change, faster intervention and improved mechanisms for consultation and information of workers.

Investment in support for workers in transition should **include income protection and active labour market policies** (ALMPs), including job placement services, training and reskilling opportunities, and support for entrepreneurship, including support for groups in vulnerable situations. In connection with sections 2 and 5 on lead and global markets, this section highlights the importance of **social conditionalities** in public funding to ensure that workers benefit from industrial support, including through collective bargaining. The Commission will strengthen labour and social standards through the above-mentioned revision of the Public Procurement Directives at the end of 2026 and will assess possible updates to state aid rules at the end of 2027 to encourage industry investment in up-skilling, re-skilling and quality jobs, including the use of training and skills conditionalities in public funding.

Finally, in 2025, the Commission will develop **guidance on social leasing** for clean products, which consists of financial support for zero emission vehicles, heat pumps and other clean technologies, including through the Social Climate Fund. It will also set up a **European Fair Transition Observatory** in the first quarter of 2026 to collect evidence on the various fairness aspects of the green transition.



## II. SOLIDAR'S OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE CID

It is important to note that the launch of the CID was accompanied by the publication of the [Omnibus proposal on corporate accountability](#). This proposal represents a **dangerous push for deregulation** under the misleading pretext of reducing administrative burdens for companies. In reality, however, [it endangers crucial social and environmental safeguards](#). Taken together, the CID and Omnibus texts fall far short of achieving their stated objectives of promoting the long-term prosperity of Europe as a whole. While presented as measures to make the EU more business-friendly, they risk increasing uncertainty for the majority of businesses and easing compliance only for the largest and often most polluting companies. The underlying assumption of both texts is clear: that **the interests of big business** are synonymous with the public good. That only by supporting corporate giants can we safeguard European jobs, uphold social standards and boost economic prosperity. This flawed logic is the result of years of [intensive lobbying by corporate interests](#) in Brussels and national capitals.

However, the evidence tells a different story. Social economy actors, grassroots initiatives and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a vital role in building community resilience, fostering prosperity and driving innovation. They provide practical solutions to urgent social and environmental issues and empower citizens. By contrast, many large companies have prioritised short-term financial gains, channelling profits into [share buybacks](#), inflated executive compensation and aggressive tax avoidance rather than reinvesting in innovation, research or workforce development. These short-sighted practices have not only failed to create long-term value but have also directly contributed to the structural challenges facing European industry today. This is not

to dismiss the real and significant problems European industries face, which the CID recognises, including some of the highest energy costs in the world and a persistently uneven international playing field. But the solution is not to remove essential safeguards or grant further concessions to big business. Instead, **the EU should prioritise investment in public goods**: from modern infrastructure and research to robust social programmes and the rapid deployment of renewable energy.

We deeply regret that the European Commission's approach to industrial policy in the CID focuses almost entirely on promoting corporate interests and competitiveness, thereby **reinforcing existing power imbalances** and overlooking the needs and rights of working communities, marginalised groups and low-income countries. The CID also overlooks the fact that Europe's response to industrial challenges is deeply intertwined with wider geopolitical, economic, social and climate concerns. Although it presents itself as a **transformative** business plan for Europe, it falls short of delivering the **systemic change** needed to address the intertwined climate, environmental and social crises we face. It reinforces market-driven solutions, maintains a vision driven by economic growth and fails to explore alternative approaches such as the **wellbeing economy**, which prioritises sustainability and social well-being over profit maximisation. As Enrico Letta argues in [his report](#), the right to move must be accompanied by the right to stay, ensuring adequate investment in all EU regions and improving services of general interest for all.

On a more positive note, the CID signals a welcome continuation of the European Green Deal rather than a retreat, reaffirming the EU's commitment to a **90% climate target** by 2040 even in the face of political backlash. However, it largely neglects key environmental concerns such as nature restoration, biodiversity and pollution reduction, as well as



resource efficiency and sufficiency. Moreover, its support for the expansion of liquefied natural gas infrastructure is **counterproductive and a waste of public money**. One silver lining is that energy communities are central to the Commission's forthcoming Citizens' Energy Package in its **Action Plan on Affordable Energy**. As **the Commission itself states**: *"Energy communities can be an effective means of re-structuring our energy systems, by empowering citizens to drive the energy transition locally and directly benefit from better energy efficiency, lower bills, reduced energy poverty and more local green job opportunities."*

Most critically, **the social and international dimensions of the CID represent its weakest points**, offering only vague commitments without clear implementation strategies, concrete actions or defined timelines. This overlooks the transversal nature of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and the need to integrate it into all policy areas, including industrial policy. It also contradicts previous commitments made by the European Commission, including its 2025 work programme of February 2025, which states that *"Europe's unique and highly treasured social model constitutes both a societal cornerstone and a competitive edge"*. The Commission's **Communication on Europe's 2040 climate target**, published in February 2024, stresses that *"achieving this target will require a number of enabling conditions, such as the full implementation of the agreed 2030 framework, ensuring the competitiveness of the European industry, a greater focus on a just transition that leaves no one behind, a level playing field with international partners, and a strategic dialogue on the post-2030 framework, including with industry and the agricultural sector"*. If the Commission recognises a just transition as equally essential to Europe's climate neutrality as competitiveness, why is it not at the core of the EU's new flagship strategy?

In conclusion, in its current form, the CID risks promoting short-term economic gains and rewarding private shareholder interests at the expense of social justice, international fairness, climate action and environmental sustainability. Furthermore, the Communication raises wider questions about the **financing** of the strategy. Where will the necessary funds come from, both in the short term and under the next MFF? Without new EU own resources and with a Stability and Growth Pact that may push Member States to reallocate funds rather than create the needed fiscal space, there is a significant risk that essential funding for social support and climate and environmental protection will be diverted to finance other priorities, including public subsidies for industries. This must not happen. Moreover, how will the EU ensure that industry is not given a blank cheque and that public funds are genuinely used to advance social, climate and environmental objectives?

The Communication also lacks a clear reference to a **shared European governance** approach, leaving decision-making primarily to Member States. This decentralised model could undermine the effectiveness of the CID, particularly in terms of territorial cohesion and accountability. While the social partners are mentioned in the section on jobs, the CID regrettably omits meaningful **social dialogue**, collective bargaining and worker participation, all of which are key elements that SOLIDAR advocates for at the heart of the CID. **Civil society organisations** and local communities must also play an active role in the decision-making processes that affect their lives, including industrial development plans and investments. Without these structures, CID risks being dominated by business interests and failing to address the rights and needs of all, including workers and groups in a vulnerable situation.





## Not enough to drive forward a just transition in Europe

The CID had the potential to be a true “Clean and Social Industrial Deal”, characterised by an equally ambitious and robust approach to industrial development, proactive climate action and comprehensive social policy. Instead, its social dimension is **underdeveloped and treated as an afterthought**. We have witnessed all too clearly the consequences of such imbalances: widening inequalities, deepening social exploitation and worsening environmental degradation, and ultimately undermining the very goal of competitiveness that the CID claims to support. Moreover, this approach risks creating the dangerous perception of a trade-off between industry, planet and people, whereas the CID should promote the narrative that prosperity depends on the alignment, not the contradiction, of these three dimensions.

The European Commission does not seem to have learned from the shortcomings of the European Green Deal (EGD), which also failed to embed a strong social dimension from the outset. Worse still, the CID makes no mention of the **European Pillar of Social Rights**, whereas the [Commission’s Communication on the EGD](#) at least acknowledged that it would “*guide action in ensuring that no one is left behind*”. Long before the CID was presented, SOLIDAR and other civil society organisations and trade unions have been saying that [social policy should be the foundation of industrial policy](#), not a mere complement to it. It is clear that the European Commission hasn’t listened.

While some sections of the Communication contain brief and general references to social issues, these are **not sufficient** to demonstrate that social considerations are effectively integrated throughout

the strategy, or that social rights are treated as a transversal priority in the CID on a par with, or as a precondition for, competitiveness. Moreover, where social actions are mentioned, they often **lack specificity**. For example, section 2 pledges to reduce household energy bills, but relies primarily on the assumption that lower energy costs for industry will eventually translate into lower consumer prices, without outlining direct measures for households. The scandalous excess profits of energy companies during the cost-of-living crisis are a clear example of the need for public intervention to ensure that the energy market is properly regulated.

Social considerations are largely **relegated to the final section**, signalling their secondary importance. Moreover, while the narrative of social fairness and a just transition is present in this section (“*Every person, community, and business should benefit from the clean transition*”), it remains empty rhetoric rather than a genuine commitment, as the section **lacks concrete, enforceable measures** and instead relies on soft law initiatives that remain vague, are likely to be delayed in implementation, and depend on uncertain funding.

The emphasis on **quality jobs** in this final section is a positive and necessary step. SOLIDAR welcomes the Commission’s initiative to propose a Quality Jobs Roadmap as a framework to **support workers in transitions**, industries and restructuring processes at both EU and Member State level. We also welcome the announced **investments to support workers**, including targeted measures for groups in a vulnerable situation, as well as the commitment to apply social conditionality in public funding to ensure that workers benefit from the support provided to industry.

However, the Commission’s overall approach prioritises providing industry with a skilled and



employable workforce rather than strengthening workers' rights and promoting social justice. The commitments outlined above are only vaguely referenced, lacking concrete details on implementation, enforcement and financing. As a result, there is a risk that they will remain nice-to-haves rather than being translated into concrete policy measures. This lack of ambition raises concerns about the CID's ability to **effectively address pressing labour market challenges**.

The social dimension of the CID places a strong emphasis on **skills**, but primarily within the narrow framework of upskilling and reskilling workers, in line with [the Draghi report](#) and the EU's Competitiveness Compass focus on skills shortages. We believe that [\*\*the Union of Skills should move away from the EU's current utilitarian approach to education and labour migration\*\*](#). It should take a broader approach to lifelong learning for all, including adults outside the labour market, considering the contribution of non-formal learning to achieve its objectives, mobilising greater public investment in education, establishing an EU competence in citizenship education, and promoting inclusive labour migration policies beyond highly skilled workers.

Industrial change affects not only workers, but entire communities and regions. Yet the CID overlooks **key social rights** such as gender equality, equal opportunities, inclusion of people with disabilities and care. It neglects the disproportionate impact of the clean transition on marginalised and vulnerable groups and does not even mention safeguards beyond employment measures, nor the need to ensure adequate social protection systems and **access to essential services**. Without targeted policies and investments to protect against additional costs and ensure the full benefits of the transition, there is a significant risk that millions of people will be left behind.

Furthermore, the **social and solidarity economy**, which is essential for inclusive and sustainable transitions, is completely absent. Finally, the CID lacks a territorial dimension and, without a strong place-based approach and context-specific planning, risks exacerbating geographical disparities, especially in regions already experiencing industrial decline.

### **Not enough to drive forward a just transition in partner countries either**

The CID emphasises the importance of equal partnerships with partner countries by promoting clean transition policies, supporting decarbonisation and highlighting the link between development, environment and trade. However, to be fully consistent with this vision, the CID should **better balance its objectives** of securing access to critical raw materials and expanding market opportunities with a **stronger commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation**, ensuring that sustainability and equitable development remain at the core of its approach.

The CTIPs will complement the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) by providing a faster, more flexible, and more targeted approach tailored to specific business interests, enabling EU industries to access partner countries' markets more efficiently. For CTIPs to truly promote equal partnerships, they should prioritise the **environmental and development dimensions** of the trade-environment-development nexus. Without this shift, CTIPs risk perpetuating outdated extractivist practices that focus on resource acquisition for EU industries.

Moreover, the CTIPs will be directly linked to the **Global Gateway** strategy, which is expected to provide the necessary investment for their implementation. However, the Global Gateway [\*\*has already been criticised\*\*](#) for its lack of transparency





in project allocation, for giving the private sector a much too dominant role in decision-making, and for providing limited consultation opportunities for civil society organisations (CSOs), trade unions and local communities and authorities. The CID therefore raises further concerns, in particular whether the EU will carry out an **impact assessment of CTIPs in partner countries** as a prerequisite, and what role CSOs and trade unions will play in monitoring CTIPs to ensure compliance with environmental, labour and human rights standards.

In reviewing the CBAM, the EU must ensure that partner countries are not unfairly disadvantaged in the clean transition. While the CBAM helps prevent unfair competition and holds industries accountable for their emissions, it may create barriers for industries in partner countries that lack the technology or resources to meet EU standards. To address this, the EU should **support industries in partner countries** through financial assistance, technology transfer and capacity building programmes to help them adopt cleaner production methods and ensure a fair and inclusive transition to sustainable trade.

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### III. CONCLUSIONS

The CID has been formally launched, but at this stage it remains a **strategic orientation**, with many key details yet to be defined. These details are expected to emerge over time as related actions are rolled out. In particular, concrete legislative initiatives are anticipated to take shape in 2025 and 2026, a crucial period when the EU and its Member States will have to take critical decisions on sectoral prioritisation, policy design and resource allocation in a context of continued global uncertainty. The outcomes of this phase will determine the success of the CID over the next four years and beyond.

However, from the outset, the CID falls short of being an ambitious, future-proof strategy. Its scope is too limited to drive systemic change or provide collective solutions to the complex challenges at hand, such as widening socio-economic inequalities. For the CID to effectively support a fair and sustainable industrial transformation, **critical gaps need to be addressed in the implementation phase**, including through the development and implementation of concrete legislative proposals and comprehensive initiatives that promote social justice and international fairness. Without a bolder approach in the coming months and years, the CID risks reinforcing existing imbalances and failing to realise the full potential of the clean transition.



## SOLIDAR'S POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A CID THAT WORKS FOR ALL

SOLIDAR calls for a CID that places social justice and fairness, both in Europe and internationally, at the very heart of its implementation, rather than treating them as peripheral considerations, as they currently appear in the Communication. As EU policymakers develop the legislation, guidelines, action plans and other instruments announced in the CID, we urge them to:

**1. Ensure that the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) serves as the guiding framework for the CID and Europe's industrial strategy as a whole.**

This requires, inter alia, integrating social provisions into all CID policies and investments from the outset, ensuring a coherent and complementary approach to industrial, social and environmental objectives. All CID decisions should be based on systematic and comprehensive assessments of their social, distributional and employment impacts. In addition, targeted and specific initiatives to address the “missing” social fairness elements of industrial policy, such as social protection and access to essential services, should be developed in connection with the CID. The social and solidarity economy should be recognised and supported as essential for economic prosperity. Trade unions must play a central role, and civil society organisations and local communities should be involved at various stages of decision-making on industrial development to ensure that the rights and needs of all, especially workers and marginalised communities, are fully taken into account.

**2. Ensure that the CID fully integrates a robust workers' rights perspective**

by systematically mainstreaming social and labour protections in all CID policies and investments. This includes the introduction of new initiatives, for example under the forthcoming Quality Jobs Roadmap, such as a Just Transition Directive for the anticipation and management of change in the world of work and a robust SURE 2.0 financial instrument to stabilise government expenditure, provide employment protection and job creation, support just transition processes and eradicate poverty. Furthermore, reducing barriers to quality employment should be a no-regret priority. All CID measures must be rooted in meaningful and effective social dialogue, with the democratic involvement of trade unions, collective bargaining and worker participation.

**3. Ensure that all investments supporting the objectives of the CID, including those planned within the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), fully contribute to overarching social objectives.**

Funding for businesses must not be obtained at the expense of existing programmes such as the European Social Fund+ (ESF+) and Erasmus+, which should be reinforced rather than redirected. Robust and harmonised environmental and social conditionalities, aligned with the EPSR, must be strictly enforced for all recipients of public funds, including through public procurement, to ensure adherence to high standards and advance sustainable development, decent



work and social inclusion. Independent monitoring mechanisms involving trade unions, CSOs and local communities are essential for ensuring compliance with these conditions and assessing the socio-economic impact of these investments, thereby promoting transparency and accountability. Finally, we reiterate our call for the [cancellation of the Omnibus proposal](#), as this threatens essential environmental and social safeguards, weakening the EU's ability to achieve its sustainability goals.

- 4. Adopt a more far-reaching approach to Lifelong Learning that does not fall short in addressing the full scope of what is needed to prepare all individuals to be active – be it on the labour market or in society as a whole.** It is essential to have the proper infrastructure in place to enable adults – in or outside the labour market – to access basic training, and to ensure that a legally binding right to training for all workers is established. This should be combined with active measures to reduce barriers to learning, be they financial, social, time or psychological.

The validation of competences acquired in non-formal learning contexts could greatly contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in the Union of Skills.

- 5. Ensure that the EU's trade and industrial policies benefit partner countries,** including by supporting their industries' development, while promoting decarbonisation and a just transition. Well-designed CTIPs can provide an alternative partnership model that strengthens the links between trade, development and environment. They should include strong monitoring mechanisms to ensure that EU industries comply with environmental, labour and human rights standards, as well as comprehensive sustainability assessments before signing. CTIPs should also commit to providing financial and technical assistance to boost local value addition, improve manufacturing and create quality jobs, while helping partner countries' industries to decarbonise through clean technologies, capacity building and fair financing.

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SOLIDAR is a European and worldwide network of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) working to advance social justice through a just transition in Europe and worldwide. Our over 50 member organisations are based in 27 countries (19 of which are EU countries) and include national CSOs in Europe, as non-EU, EU-wide and organisations active at the international level.



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