THE GLOBAL GATEWAY

SOLIDAR Advocacy Toolkit

Counter Balance Challenging Public Investment Banks

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This Advocacy Toolkit has been developed to support SOLIDAR's members and partners in their engagement with the European Union's Global Gateway strategy. It explains what the Global Gateway is about, the critical questions surrounding it and offers advocacy tools designed to support CSOs in their work with EU institutions, Member States' representatives, governments, and local authorities in the countries involved in and impacted by Global Gateway projects. The aim is to influence the strategy's implementation, promote transparency and meaningful involvement, and ensure that development cooperation policies remain focused on their core objective: the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty.

The toolkit is the result of a collaboration between **SOLIDAR** and **Counter Balance** and draws on a series of workshops and consultations held during the year 2024 within SOLIDAR, its members, and partners. It also builds on key insights from the Counter Balance, Oxfam and Eurodad report, "**Who Profits from the Global Gateway?**"

By grounding its recommendations in EU legal obligations, such as those outlined in the Treaties of the European Union, the NDICI-GE Regulation, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, this toolkit aims at equipping CSOs with the necessary instruments and messages to engage effectively with policymakers and stakeholders.

The current political cycle offers different opportunities to influence and revise the Global Gateway strategy. Key moments include the negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and subsequent negotiations on sectoral regulations.

1. OVERVIEW

1.1 Background

The Global Gateway strategy was introduced by the EC and the High Representative/Vice President in 2021. According to the **EU's Communication**, this strategy *"aims to forge links and not create dependencies. To invest in projects that can be delivered with high standards, good governance and transparency."* To do so, the Global Gateway approach intends to mobilise € 300 billion[1] in investments between 2021 and 2027 across five sectors:

1. climate and energy;
2. digital;
3. transport;
4. health;
5. education and research.

This plan is promoted as the **EU's alternative offer to Chinese (and Russian) investments and influence,** supposedly more attractive thanks to democratic values and high standards in transparency and governance in EU finance. The roots of the Global Gateway are telling. The strategy dates back to the idea of using 'connectivity' as a foreign policy tool in 2017 – that is fostering deeper economic and people-to-people ties based on principles of free trade and a market economy. Increased geopolitical competition and efforts to secure access to energy, raw materials and supply chains – particularly exposed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic – has further triggered the EU's Global Gateway proposal.

The Global Gateway is set within a context of global development finance agenda, namely the G7's Build Back Better World partnership launched in 2021 rebranded now as Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), aiming to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative by advancing public and private investments (see a list of PGII flagship projects **here**). Some of its projects are supported also via the Global Gateway. In Europe, Italy's Mattei Plan is another example of plans that are interlinked with the Global Gateway.

While the strategy relies on the EU's development finance tools, **the aims of the Global Gateway explicitly include boosting competitiveness of and creating investment opportunities for EU companies.** This marks a significant shift in the EU's development cooperation agenda, noted also by an increased use of development finance to mobilise private sector investments in order to fill the so-called financing gap.

The link between the EU's internal and external goals is evident in the Global Gateway's inclusion in EU policies. It is featured in the Green Deal Industrial Plan, where it plays a role in securing Europe's energy needs, especially in developing green hydrogen projects and building digital infrastructure in partner countries. It is also included in the **Critical Raw Materials Act** and recently it appeared in the influential **Draghi report**.

1 The Global Gateway's €300 billion investment plan is funded through a mix of EU resources and leveraged investments:
€53 billion comes from the EU's External Action Guarantee, mainly via the EFSD+, which includes:
- €26.7 billion for the European Investment Bank (EIB);
- €13 billion in other guarantees (half dedicated to Global Gateway projects);

€18 billion in EU grants is available for blending, budget support, and technical assistance.

These EU funds are expected to:
- Mobilise €135 billion in additional public and private investments;
- Leverage €145 billion from Member States' financial and development institutions.

Together, these elements make up the €300 billion target.

This growing alignment of the Global Gateway with the EU's internal priorities – such as energy security and industrial competitiveness – raises serious concerns about the **shift away from a development agenda centred on poverty eradication and sustainability.** These concerns are further compounded by the strategy's lack of democratic legitimacy, with no meaningful consultation of partner countries, civil society, or the European Parliament (EP) in its design or implementation.

In fact, looking at the adoption process of the Global Gateway strategy by the EU, it is evident that this policy agenda lacks any democratic decision-making. It was adopted and implemented without conducting prior consultations or involvement of the EP or civil society, and it entirely omitted public consultations with partner countries in the Global South. Such democratic deficit makes it a top-down EU plan for investment in infrastructure development around the world.

As a result, the scrutiny of the Global Gateway is extremely limited. The EP plays only a marginal role (see section 'Advocacy targets'). There is no legal role for the EPs development and foreign affairs committees in the Global Gateway, leaving implementation (or the lack of it) of the EP's decisions to the discretion of the EC. The EP's most promising role in accountability of the Global Gateway finance is budgetary oversight, as the EP approves EU budget. With regard to civil society, the **Global Gateway Civil Society and Local Authorities Advisory Platform** is a weak 'tick-box' exercise at present, with no role in design, selection or implementation process of the project. Their involvement is essential for a successful and people-centred development finance strategy, most of all in countries where the projects are carried out. **CSOs also have the role of informing citizens in the areas where projects are implemented and can help connecting EU development finance actors with local governments, to protect and promote people's rights and needs.**

1.2 Development finance model

Key implementing actors of the Global Gateway are the EU's development finance institutions (DFIs) – the European Investment Bank (EIB) and national public banks. In addition, **EU development budget tools to attract investment are deployed**, namely guarantees (€ 53 billion) under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), and grants (€ 18 billion) to support blending operations, involving guarantees and/or technical assistance.

What are guarantees?

Guarantees are a type of insurance meant to protect financial institutions and private investors from the risks of non-payment. They are provided by institutions such as the EC (mainly the so-called European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus in its external action, but also domestically via different programmes), as well as development banks like the EIB itself. They are legally binding agreements under which the providing institutions (the guarantor) agree to pay the missing amount of a loan in case of non-payment, or a loss of value in the case of an investment. They are an increasingly used tool in development finance to 'mobilise private finance' amidst decreasing Official Development Aid contributions of the EU and falling short of the EU's objective of spending at least 0.7% of its GDP on development aid (For more, see for instance Eurodad's **report** on the guarantees).

Moreover, guarantees are not free and entail fees that providers charge for the service. According to the EIB, the fees charged by the EC on top of the EIB's own fees fall on the promoters and final beneficiaries. In addition, **experts warn** that there is a risk that some institutions providing the guarantees might in fact end up running this financing scheme at a profit. As a result, the difference between development institutions and commercially oriented bodies such as export credit agencies becomes increasingly blurry. This is concerning when speaking of finance which has a development as a mandate, not profit-making.

Guarantees can also play a role in the so-called **blended finance**, which also aims to mobilise additional public or private investments from other actors. It combines public concessional finance (meaning cheaper finance with better terms than commercial banks have to offer) from development finance institutions (DFIs), and public or private resources. It means that guarantees, as well as grants, loans, and in some cases equity investments, are used in one package to support projects in recipient countries that are not offering immediate and certain profits (they are not 'bankable') and cannot rely only on guarantees to take off.

Guarantees, as they are currently used, tend to support 'bankable' projects, meaning they will be making profits that are sufficiently attractive for a company to invest into a project. To make better use of this tool, bankability should not be the main objective, but support should go to projects that don't offer immediate profits but are economically viable in the long term (that is, the project's costs end up being repaid after a period of time and there is no loss).

Apart from EFSD+, other instruments can be used, such as **Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe** or **InvestEU**. These tools might be merged into one budget pool with allocations for each member state, as outlined by the EC in its **next budget proposal for 2028-2033**. Export credit finance is also deployed: export credit agencies (ECAs) are bodies set up to promote businesses of an exporting nation and have no development mandate. In fact, they have negative human rights and environmental track record, and have very low transparency, accountability and due diligence standards. Civil society organisations are calling for an updated EU Regulation to fix those issues. For more on problems with involving export credit finance in development projects, see **here**.

This approach, also known as 'derisking' and deployed inside the EU as well under programmes such as InvestEU, allows to reduce risk borne by companies by absorbing losses, thereby attracting them to invest in 'development' projects as their investments would be less risky and generate satisfactory profits.

The rationale behind this approach is that public banks can offer better conditions for loans than commercial banks or investors, such as longer payback time or lower interest rates. However, these conditions are largely untransparent, making it difficult to estimate concessionality of loans. For example, **research of CAN Europe** shows that only 2% of climate finance loans of the EIB were concessional (2021).

Moreover, key beneficiaries of the Global Gateway are European companies. Eurodad and Counter Balance **report** looking at 40 Gateway projects shows that at least 60% of them have already benefitted at least one European company. **According to the EC**, so far € 179 billion investments were mobilised (2021-23):

50 billion supported by EU, 129 billion mobilised by Member States, EIB and EBRD. However, information on where this money went is not disclosed.

1.3 Key issues

There are four key issues of this development finance approach which form the core of the Global Gateway criticism:

1. Projects are designed to **generate revenue for the private investors** (explicitly prioritising European companies), as opposed to supporting projects that do not offer appealing profits but bring a clear high development impact – such as universal public services meeting people's basic needs. The approach also ignores evidence of more efficient and cheaper solutions to aid a global just energy transition, for example public renewable energy, amidst unwillingness of the private sector to invest in the sector.

2. Public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are supported under the Global Gateway, entail well-documented risks – they are costly, put excessive costs on taxpayers, lack transparency, accountability, and public consultations and participation.

3. Promotion of European companies can lead to **informally tied aid,** which risks increasing costs of development projects by up to 30%. At the same time, there is no evidence of the EU's efforts to encourage a meaningful participation of local companies, proposing actually mutually beneficial partnerships and creating added value in the countries. Current strategy seems to do the opposite of what the Global Gateway communication claims: "not fostering dependencies."

4. Debt burdens in the Global South can be exacerbated, especially as the Global Gateway projects are implemented through loans in 29 out of 37 Heavily Indebted and Poor Countries (HIPCs). Global South governments also co-invest public funds, but it is (often European) companies that are derisked. It is not publicly disclosed how much financial risks each entity participating in a given project actually bears. This is particularly concerning in projects that are cancelled, stall or fail, or do not look promising from the start (such as hydrogen). Moreover, EU guarantees contradict some countries' own debt rules.

2. PROJECTS

The Global Gateway broadly covers three kinds of interventions across the five sectors, all of which can be considered to form '**flagship projects**': **concrete infrastructure projects, reforms and regulatory agenda and memoranda of understanding** (MoUs) about fostering cooperation and opportunities in a given area (notably in critical raw materials and hydrogen). So far, three annual lists (2023-2025) of 271 flagship projects in total have been presented. However, the Global Gateway extends beyond these flagship projects and should be understood as an agenda-setting strategy of the EU to orient development finance for Global Gateway priorities. For instance, the EIB promotes some projects as aligned with the strategy, but that are not featured on the flagship projects lists.

In terms of sectoral distribution of projects (see chart below), the largest share of flagship projects in years 2023-25 (in total 271) goes to the climate and energy sector (49.8%), and transport (19.9%). Next follow digital (12.9%), health (10%) and education and research (7.4%) sectors. This seems to reflect the scale of business opportunities each sector offers to European companies.



Chart: Global Gateway projects 2023-2025 by sector

1. Energy and climate:

Types of projects in energy: Renewables including solar, wind, hydrogen, geothermal energy, hydropower; subsea electricity cables and transmission lines, and biogas; supporting Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs).

Types of projects in climate: Nature-based solutions, debt for nature/climate swaps, agriculture, waste and water treatment, bioeconomy, housing, coastal protection, critical raw materials (14 partnerships).

2. Digital:

Types of projects: subsea fibre optic cables (for faster Internet connection), 5G, data centres; cooperation on reforms towards expanding business opportunities and data access arising from digitalisation, and on data governance.

3. Health:

Types of projects: Infrastructure, development of pharmaceutical supply chains and vaccines, digital health, reforms cooperation on enabling a regulatory environment and business opportunities; emblematic project: Regional Health Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technology Products in Africa (MAV+) — BioNTech; Global polio eradication programme of Bill and Melinda Gates foundation.

4. Transport:

Types of projects: highways, ports, airports, electric mobility, railway, metro, tram, bus network (including gas), trade and shipment corridors.

5. Education and research:

Types of projects: vocational education and training (VET) programmes, including focusing on women;

developing schools' infrastructure and capacity building; education and teacher reforms; the Global Partnership for Education (the largest global fund solely dedicated to transforming education in lower-income countries, and a unique, multi-stakeholder partnership. GPE works with Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, IBM, HP, among others); access to sexual and reproductive rights commodities.

2.1 Zoom-in: Energy and climate projects

Energy projects under the Global Gateway follow a private sector energy model aiming to create opportunities for corporate investments into energy projects and are complemented by promoted reforms to liberalise and privatise energy markets in the Global South countries. Rather than serving a global just transition, these projects primarily serve the EU's interests – feeding Europe's energy demand and **creating market opportunities for its companies.**

The EU's internal Green Deal, just transition and industrial policies are reflected in the bloc's engagements in the Global South. For instance, the EU's ambitions entail promoting 'green growth,' expanding the single market and promoting liberalisation and deregulation to favour European corporate interests as part and parcel of market-driven solutions to the climate crisis. This is visible in the Global Gateway's reform agenda promoted in recipient countries through which the **EU strives to facilitate opportunities for its companies – for instance by fostering an 'enabling environment' for the private sector.**

The EU systematically neglects the public finance required to deliver affordable and quality public services and infrastructure and promotes conservative fiscal policies that constrain public spending. As a result, development cooperation increasingly focuses on projects that promise financial returns – often sidelining initiatives with high social or environmental value that may not be immediately profitable.

In the energy sector, this logic translates into support for privately operated renewable energy projects, often developed by Independent Power Producers with buyer agreements guaranteeing satisfactory profits. Publicly owned and operated energy systems, **which evidence shows are often more effective and efficient** in delivering renewable energy, receive far less support. In addition, experts warn that the derisking approach aiming to entice the private sector into renewable energy investments is not effective due to the low profitability of renewable energy investments. In many Global South countries, capacity of facilitating needed investments into renewable energy is further curtailed by the burden of debt repayments. As a result, **this policy and financing model is not capable of delivering decarbonisation at a scale and time needed to fulfil promises of the Paris Agreement.**

At the same time, the EU continues to channel public funds – both internal and development-related – towards large companies, including fossil fuel firms, without attaching meaningful conditions. The bloc provides carrots to large polluting companies to invest in renewables, despite the fact that these companies do not have a science-based decarbonisation plan. Fossil fuel companies such as Enel or Engie keep benefitting from the EU's internal as well as development finance despite **no credible intention to decarbonise their activities**. Moreover, European companies receiving public support are not required to adhere to any labour and social rights standards or reinvestment targets – an issue increasingly **raised by European trade unions** in the context of the EU's promise to revise its public procurement directive. In the Global South, this means that European companies with well-known negative human rights and environmental impact track record can receive development funds. At the same time, they have a green light to exploit cheap labour, employ workers under inadequate labour conditions, or finance projects without providing any benefits to local economy.

The Global Gateway's bundling of climate and energy investments further exposes its business-centred logic. Climate mitigation measures rely on emissions reduction through technological solutions and infrastructure. In effect, they blend with the Gateway's energy sector investments aiming to create business opportunities for European companies. Given the strategy's investment-centred approach **looking to generate profits,** this means that **less profitable investments, for instance in adaptation measures, are deprioritised,** such as soil and forest health, agroecology, or resilience to extreme weather. Some projects on forest protection and other adaptation solutions do exist under the Global Gateway, but their scale and impacts are yet to be seen.

The EU also supports Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), a climate finance framework supported by world leaders, the World Bank and the IMF, and over 550 companies for a green transition in the Global South countries aiming to mobilise investments from rich Global North countries and the private sector to help the Global South phase out coal and accelerate renewable energy deployment, as well as address the social consequences of a just energy transition on jobs and communities. **Private-sector centred approach is appealing to Global North countries, who are unwilling to put needed public funds into climate justice** and instead use its funds to 'mobilise private finance' with a hope to benefit their own companies.

The shortcomings of this approach relying on private finance to 'decarbonise' the Global South, embedded in JETPs and the Global Gateway's energy investments, can be highlighted by the fact that JETPs have not been successful so far: the finance raised has been insufficient, and countries with JETP projects continue to keep fossil fuel energy plants operational. According to **Trade Unions for Energy Democracy** (TUED), JETPs represent **'green structural adjustment programmes'** built on reforms and private-sector-led energy expansion instead of supporting a just energy transition. JETPs, as well as Global Gateway projects, are financed through conditional loans that **exacerbate debt, limiting the ability of governments to use its budgets** for socially and environmentally beneficial investments they deem necessary. They also demand a range of **reforms favouring the privatisation agenda** – largely benefitting foreign-owned enterprises.

This raises serious questions about whether Global Gateway energy investments truly support just transition principles or deliver tangible developmental benefits. **Publicly owned energy models – proven to be more cost-effective and impactful – are often sidelined.** The capacity of these projects to create decent, long-term jobs is also questionable, and **unions are not systematically included in their selection, design, or implementation.**

Moreover, **research** shows that China's renewable energy projects in Africa, which rely on Chinese subcontractors building the renewable energy projects, have a limited ability to create permanent and high-skilled jobs, usually resulting only in temporary low-skilled contracts for local workers. In this aspect, the Global Gateway follows a similar logic of contracts benefitting European companies as subcontractors building projects in the Global South. In the case of Chinese investments, finance is directly tied to Chinese companies due to involvement of China's Exim bank, an export credit agency.

The EU's development aid, on the other hand, must be untied to EU companies. Current projects therefore show a risk of exacerbating informally tied aid, further risking increasing costs of the projects and robbing the Global South countries from creating their own productive sectors in renewable energy that offer good jobs and benefit from higher added value retained locally.

Some projects, like green hydrogen development in North Africa, Namibia or Chile, are **explicitly aimed at export to the EU.** Other project serving EU needs is for example a subsea electricity cable Elmed Interconnector between Tunisia and the EU via Italy. It aims to import renewable electricity generated in Tunisia to Europe (with a risk of exporting fossil-fuel generated electricity while sufficient RE capacity is developed). Such ambitions are often marketed behind **lip service of providing energy also locally,** a claim difficult to verify, while civil society actors, media and researchers show that local use of green hydrogen or energy are not likely to take place. In effect, such EU energy investments do not aim at prioritising the affordable and sustainable energy needs of over 730 million people globally – around 9.1% of the world population – who currently do not have access to electricity. As energy access is an essential aspect of development policies, the EU's ability to serve development needs is therefore highly problematic.

The Global Gateway projects in climate and energy also entail **negative environmental and social impacts,** or a risk thereof. **Insufficient human rights and environmental standards of development finance institutions** implementing the Global Gateway projects pose further risk of occurrence of such impacts. For instance, one project includes modernisation of a geothermal plant in Kenya (Olkaria). This plant was already financed by the EIB since 1982, and its construction has previously led to forced evictions of thousands of local communities and negative health impacts on people and livestock, and destruction of their way of life. Local population did not get access to jobs or fair resettlement deals. The EIB has failed to recognise the indigenous people and to negotiate resettlement accordingly. Now, the same company will benefit from the Global Gateway money to expand the plant, and build a new one in Ethiopia, subcontracted to be built by a French company.

2.2 Project examples

The following examples from Latin America and Africa illustrate how Global Gateway projects play out in practice. While they are framed as supporting green transitions and connectivity in the regions, they raise important questions about local impacts, debt, job quality, and whose interests are ultimately being served. These cases highlight the need for greater transparency, inclusiveness, and alignment with just transition principles on the ground.

A. Hydrogen in Chile (2 Global Gateway projects):

Global Gateway Renewable Hydrogen Fund for Chile / Team Europe Renewable Hydrogen Funding Platform for Chile – is a joint initiative by the EC, the EIB and the German Development Bank (KfW) with Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) and the Chilean Ministry of Finance.

Its goals are:

- To promote the incipient renewable hydrogen market in Chile and foster local supply chains, while considering the importance of a just energy transition, and to support the Chilean government in this;

- To achieve the transition of the mining sector into low carbon mining;
- To become a regional lead on Green Hydrogen and promote South-South cooperation;
- According to the EIB, to decarbonise Chile's economy, create green jobs and generate business opportunities for Chilean and European companies while also helping Europe meet its import demand for renewable hydrogen.

To achieve the objectives, activities will include creating enabling environment through regulatory and policy development support, green H2 production and application projects, GH2 technological development and production; facilitation of private sector investment through blending and/or investment de-risking mechanisms. The project entails a loan to Chile of up to € 200 m (€ 100 m each EIB and KfW), with CORFO as the implementing agency to channel the funds to renewable hydrogen initiatives, and a grant from the EU Latin America and Caribbean Investment Facility (LACIF) of € 16.5 m. CORFO already signed agreements with 6 companies: Enel Green Power, Linde, ENGIE, Air Liquide, GNL Quintero and CAP.

Examples of these companies' investments include Engie's project to supply Enaex, a leading company in integral rock fragmentation services (raw materials) for green ammonia production to reduce its emissions, Air Liquide's Antofagasta Mining Energy Renewable project, Germany's Linde will replace part of the grey hydrogen currently produced in the Aconcagua oil refinery located in the Valparaíso Region, Enel's Green Power project for green hydrogen in the Magallanes Region, which will be sold to HIF Chile to produce ethanol and e-gasoline for exportation to Europe.

HIF Chile – Highly Innovative Fuels Global – is an international electro fuels company founded in 2016 by Chilean-Peruvian company AME and backed by German automaker Porsche AG. HIF launched Haru Oni demonstration plant located in the Magallanes Region of Chile – a Global Gateway project (falling under Team Europe Initiative) which aims at testing e-fuels of hydrogen and CO2, financed by Porsche, Exxon Mobil, Siemens.

Team Europe 'RH2 Project' in Chile: Development of Renewable Hydrogen: a technical assistance program that will strengthen the conditions for the promotion of the renewable and sustainable hydrogen economy in Chile. At the same time, the project is framed in the context of the European Green Deal. Newly created European Hydrogen Bank is supposed to help import hydrogen to the EU from third countries.

According to the project description, EU Member States take part in the TEI RH2 initiative "via various courses of action, mainly via the private sector: company missions/chambers of commerce, supply and development of technology, investors and promoters of projects, users of renewable energies and synthetic fuels, research and innovation actions, ... memoranda of understanding for the import of RH2 with European ports (Rotterdam, Antwerp, Zeebrugge, Hamburg) and international cooperation programmes to promote the development/imports of renewable hydrogen, such as Germany's Global H2 programme, in which the Netherlands is also participating."

It will also entail the creation of an enabling environment for the renewable hydrogen economy; capacity building and knowledge transfer; generation of impact assessments on infrastructure and sustainability; as well as the development of projects and business cooperation and financing.

It includes finance of € 2.4 m from the EU, and € 4 m from the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection (BMWK), as well as the Platform's finance.

Under this project, a European consortium-HNH Energy, comprising Austrian companies Austria Energy and Ökowing, and Danish investment fund Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners (CIP) - has announced an ambitious US$11 billion project to produce and export green ammonia in the Magallanes region, with what has been defined as "**one of Chile's largest-ever environmental assessment projects**." It is hard to see how these activities can be construed as development projects supporting just transition in Chile.

The main concerns can be summarised as following:

1. **Race to the bottom:** Chile wants to become the cheapest hydrogen producer in the world by 2030, one of top three exporters by 2040. Given logistical challenges in exporting hydrogen, this means that costs would need to be reduced to the maximum in all available parts of the supply chain for prices to be sufficiently competitive on international markets. Therefore, ensuring well-paid, quality and permanent jobs will be challenging.

2. **Export focus:** Hydrogen serving export markets does not support a just transition in Chile and deprioritises the country's own renewable affordable energy needs. This also highlights the neocolonial vision the Global Gateway promotes as development cooperation, appropriating cheap resources from abroad, while depleting local water resources needed for such green hydrogen projects, and risking causing lang grabs and damage to ecosystems and local communities.

3. **Debt and socio-economic impacts:** green hydrogen's current costs (production, infrastructure, storage and distribution expenses, etc.) make it an unviable decarbonisation option, and its future is seriously questioned and discarded even in mainstream media like the **Financial Times**. Relying on unviable plans and failed projects risks putting an additional debt burden on the recipient country's governments and taxpayers and put socio-economic development in jeopardy, and prevent the country from pursuing proven, sustainable development and just transition plans.

4. **Benefit to EU companies:** European companies are taking advantage of EU development funds to promote its own business interests, many of them making huge profits already. It is unclear how effective will be 'technology transfer and development' promoted under the project as evidence of concrete activities undertaken or planned in this regard is missing, especially given overall challenges in technology transfer experienced in the Global South.

5. **Environmental, social, human rights damages:** local and national organisations protest the projects and transformation of regions, including **Magallanes** where Global Gateway is implemented, into '**sacrifice zones**' – displacing local communities and impacting their rights, and severely **harming ecosystems**.

6. **Unfair trade agreements:** EU trade policies contradict development and just transition principles. The EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement is supposed to lead to decline of skilled jobs in 24 out of 31 sectors, most in manufacturing (according to the **EU's own assessment**). Free trade agreements risk disempowering countries to use governmental budgets towards a just

transition and development through imposed conditions. Moreover, specific issues like Chile's ability to control the flow of resources to Europe were documented.

Looking at the EU legal obligations these projects clearly do not prioritise eradication of poverty, the EU's key development cooperation goal, and do not correspond to principles set out in EU treaties, and instead rather contradict them. For the complete list of the obligations referred to, check below the paragraph 3.1 EU Legal Obligations.

B. Lobito Corridor

The **Lobito Corridor** is an infrastructure project connecting the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to regional and global trade markets via the port of Lobito in Angola. It aims at securing fast access for the EU to raw materials in the region, specifically copper and cobalt. The geopolitical interest aims at countering Chinese role in the region (e.g. TAZARA railway, the Lobito port built by China, sections of the old 'LC' railway, in Angola). The project is advanced through a multitude of MoUs, and consists of rehabilitation and expansion of railway, transport and logistics infrastructure.

The Corridor is also supposed to enhance export possibilities for Angola, the DRC and Zambia, and 'create added value and jobs through investments and soft measures.' In effect, benefits for the countries should be the creation of thousands of jobs, tax revenue, infrastructure, creation of SMEs and local economic growth, benefit to other sectors like logistics, transportation, agribusiness, or renewable energy sector.

The project is not an exclusive EU idea: the first strategic economic corridor was launched under the flagship G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) in May 2023, to which EU extended support. The **costs estimated by the EC** are € 300-400 m (DRC) plus € 2.5-3 b (Zambia). Moreover, it is viewed as a test case for other economic corridors, a model to replicate in other parts of Africa and the world (e.g. in Philippines).

The project was awarded concession by Angolan government for 30 years to a consortium, the Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR), who is to operate and manage the infrastructure. It is composed of multinational commodity trader Trafigura (49.5%), Portuguese construction and engineering company Mota-Engil (49.5%), and Vecturis, Belgian private railway operator (1%). The project is conceived as a **public-private-partnership** (PPP).



The financing is channelled from Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) and Africa Development Bank, The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), and the US International Development Finance Corporation. The EC's financial contribution is unclear; according to the info the EC has provided, € 605 m has been mobilised (across five sectors:

€ 77 m for trade and transit facilitation, € 261,5 m for energy and climate, € 71,7 m for critical raw materials-related value chains, € 98 m for education, skill development and job creation, and € 96,7 m for agricultural value-chains. It is not clear what are the investments envisioned under these sectors, who implements them, and from what sources is the money mobilised.) Italy committed € 300 m, part of its Mattei Plan.

What are the issues and risks?

1. Colonial blueprint: The project aims to export CRMs as cheaply and quickly as possible to the EU and the US, and to keep it cheap, private investors are unlikely to become interested in financing activities that facilitate economic benefit locally, or development of local processing and related industry (local value added).

2. Negative human rights and environmental impacts: Trafigura has major interests in the Copperbelt. It runs a copper and cobalt deposit together with Chemaf, a Dubai-based mining group, in the then-artisanal Mutoshi mine near Kolwezi. In 2022, Trafigura signed a $600 million deal with Chemaf to finance the completion of the mine and to market the production of cobalt. The acquisition of the mine by Chemaf led to forced evictions around the site that included the burning of settlements and sexual abuse, for which Chemaf denies responsibility despite strong elements supporting the accusations, as Amnesty reported. Mota-Engil has been involved throughout recent years in corruption controversies outside Portugal, such as fraud in obtaining a railway contract or tax fraud, and in participating in a bid-manipulating cartel for Portuguese rail maintenance to be paid a higher sum by public authorities.

3. Unclear development impact: According to Amnesty International, the regional mining practices in DRC had negative impact on the locals: "... many communities in and around Kolwezi have become collateral damage of energy transition mining. They depict what happened after multinational mining companies began developing or expanding cobalt and copper mines, and the human rights abuses caused by the eviction of neighbouring communities." The project also promotes creation of additional benefits for the communities and economies. However, given the lack of finance needed even for the railway infrastructure, and a lack of conditionality imposed on companies benefitting from development money, it is questionable to what extend EU promises can materialise, namely developing clean energy projects to increase the power supply to surrounding communities, investment clean energy supply chain, growing agriculture value chains to enhance local food production, as well as augmenting local workforce training, support for small and medium enterprises and economic diversification.

The railway is also planned through a dense Angolan tropical rainforest. Except for some grain silos and processing units along the rail route, the route is far from any industrial or population centres. It is hard to see what spillover effects in terms of local added value creation such a project can have. However, it is clear that it is benefitting Western capital: beneficiaries include mining companies that invested in the region, such as Canadian Ivanhoe, KoBold Metals in the US (backed by investors with finance from Gates and Bezos), or the LAR members.

4. Unsuitable financing model: in PPPs, many concerns about development impact are raised, including that implementation often lacks public consultation and participation, while contract negotiations are untransparent and lack accountability, and PPP projects can be more expensive.

5. Contradictory policies: While the EU supposedly supports local benefits from the Lobito Corridor, it also supports parallel projects that contradict development objectives. The EU signed a MoU with Rwanda on cooperation in critical raw materials, an agreement widely denounced by local and international civil society organisations. The EP passed a **resolution** in February 2025 calling for the suspension of the deal. This is because Rwanda is involved in the war in DRC's minerals-rich province and is accused of supporting rebel fighters who control eastern province's minerals when the deal was signed. Yet, reports indicate that DRC's minerals are in fact smuggled into Rwanda, and the MoU is described by researchers as a deal that '**justifies … and formalises**' illicit trade. DRC has demanded an international embargo on Rwanda's mineral exports. Moreover, in order to verify the source of the minerals, the EU's MoU relies on Rwanda's claims. In effect, such projects risk fuelling conflict.

Similarly, as in the case of Chile, the Lobito Corridor clearly does not prioritise eradication of poverty. They also do not correspond to principles set out in EU treaties and instead rather contradict them (see below the section 'EU legal obligations').

3. ADVOCACY TOOLBOX

This chapter offers practical tools for CSOs engaging on Global Gateway. As the initiative reshapes EU development cooperation, it's essential for CSOs to be equipped with clear demands and strong leverage to hold institutions accountable. The toolbox brings together proposals for key advocacy asks, relevant EU legal obligations, findings from the European Court of Auditors, and recent political developments – such as Commissioner Síkela's confirmation hearing. Finally, it provides a table with advocacy targets and concrete entry points for influencing EU decision-makers and financial actors.

3.1 What needs to change? Advocacy objectives and asks

As the EU continues to reframe its development policies with the Global Gateway strategy, there is a pressing need for a redefined approach that reflects the values of sustainability, human rights, and equitable development. Based on the above reflections, this section outlines the key advocacy objectives and specific asks for a more inclusive, transparent, and impactful Global Gateway strategy, focusing on ensuring local stakeholders' participation, promoting accountability, and prioritizing developmental, environmental and social elements in EU-supported projects.

Overarching advocacy objective: The EU aligns its development finance with the Union's key development cooperation objective of eradicating poverty, and supports projects that lead to sustainable development, reduction of inequality, protection of human rights and a global just transition.

Objective 1: The EU supports projects with proven evidence of developmental additionality – namely those providing affordable public services and infrastructure to fulfil people's needs and promoting sustainable socio-economic development through local economic activity with high added value.

Objective 2: CSOs and local stakeholders inform EU development cooperation and finance to ensure EU projects are implemented in line with local needs and in an inclusive and participatory manner.

Objective 3: The EU becomes transparent and accountable in its Global Gateway investments.

The outlined specific recommendations to the EU, including its Member States and development finance institutions, can serve towards attaining these objectives. They are devised on the basis of the work of Counter Balance, Oxfam and Eurodad, and their report '**Who profits from the Global Gateway? The EU's new strategy for development cooperation**,' and on discussion held in the SOLIDAR network during the training sessions on the Global Gateway.

Which changes shall we call for to the EU?

1. Re-evaluate the Global Gateway strategy

- The EC should devise a development cooperation strategy together with the Global South, which is rooted in sovereignty, self-sufficiency, and a just international cooperation framework, and prioritises:
    - o Transparent and accountable public-public partnership projects and cooperation with public entities to avoid financialisaton of public services, as well as support to civil society organisations;

- o Grants-based finance instead of loans to avoid debt and to ensure the provision of affordable and quality public services and sustainable infrastructures;
- o Projects promoting regional cooperation instead of country-by-country projects should be supported;
- o Projects with clear local added value for society and/or economic development.

- The EC, as well as Member States and DFIs, should apply conditions on involving companies in development projects:
  - o Only companies that can present strong and clear evidence of long-term development additionality for their involvement in a development project can be involved;
  - o Local companies should be clearly prioritised, especially women-led, that support environmental sustainability and the socio-economic needs of Indigenous and local communities;
  - o European companies must commit in contractual agreements to sharing know-how and to technology transfer to local entities[2];
  - o Companies should be engaged under appropriate and transparent financial framework aligned with development objectives (e.g. questions of final ownership, repayment and guarantee conditions, or service fees);
  - o Only those companies can be involved which:
    - ▪ Comply with the highest standards of due diligence (as set out in the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive);
    - ▪ Respect human and workers' rights, including collective bargaining rights, and fulfil labour standards in line with ILO recommendations;
    - ▪ Are aligned with the Paris Agreement, and with Just Transition principles;
    - ▪ Demonstrate a clear contribution to development objectives, amongst others through a clean track record of activities compatible with EU development cooperation goals and principles;
    - ▪ Contracts should entail a clear suspension clause in case of non-compliance.

2 This has been already done in Chinese contracts for instance.

2. The EU must adopt high standards in the Global Gateway's decision-making, procurement, transparency, and implementation processes

- The EC must carry out and publish:
  - o Economic, financial, social, environmental and legal impact assessment of projects falling within the Global Gateway, demonstrating their suitability and compatibility with the EU values and principles;
  - o Monitoring and evaluation throughout the life-cycle phases of the project;
- The EC must make publicly available all minutes of meetings between its officials and members of the Business Advisory Group, where the Global Gateway is discussed;
- The EC and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) should publish methodology and evaluation to explain their choices for project selection and finance allocation, in particular allocation of EFSD+ guarantees;
- DFIs implementing Global Gateway projects, such as the EIB, must make each project-related debt assessment publicly available;
- The EC should make their own debt assessment in countries where the EFSD+ guarantee is used, given the risk of debt creation by EFSD+;
- The EC must publish final beneficiaries of awarded contracts that benefit from EFSD+ guarantee, the list of EU guarantees and grants for projects, and disaggregated data on total project finance from all public and private sources;

- Business trips, missions, and any other activities focused on supporting EU corporate interests related to Global Gateway projects should not be financed by the EU development budget.

3. Put in place processes and mechanisms to allow for public and parliamentary scrutiny of the Global Gateway, both in Europe and in the Global South.

- The EP, social partners and CSOs should formally scrutinise the Global Gateway strategy and its implementation;
- Civil Society and Local Authorities Advisory Platform's mandate and role has to be fully transformed, including to allow for the inclusive participation of all interested CSOs and women rights' organisations in scrutinising the Global Gateway;
- Local actors and civil society must have an active role in the selection, design, and implementation of all projects receiving support from the EU development budget and EU external investments. This means that CSOs' opposition must be fully reflected in project selection. To ensure such participation, national platforms can be set up with the participation of local governments, unions and CSOs;
- CSOs should continue to have access to independent and well-resourced funding channels to strengthen their work and societal role, enabling them to choose their work areas based on their own priorities – that is, funding must not be tied to Global Gateway projects' implementation.

4. Review the alignment of the Global Gateway with the EU Treaties, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and development regulations (NDICI-GE), particularly before the EU budget for the period post-2027 is approved.

- The EC should carry out a public civil society consultation to evaluate the Global Gateway to shape the EU's next development cooperation strategy;
- The new College of Commissioners for the period 2024-29 should follow the development and external action mandate set out in the EU Treaties and enshrine solid legal basis for its development cooperation instruments to ensure that development policy is not a strategy to generate corporate profits.

3.2 Advocacy Tools

3.2.1 EU legal obligations

A key leverage in CSOs' advocacy work on the Global Gateway and the accountability of the EU are objectives and principles set out in the EU's legal documents. As the Global Gateway relies on EU development budgets and constitutes external action and development cooperation, it is obliged to align with EU treaties and the NDICI-GE Regulation 2021/947, reflecting its objectives.

Most relevant points from the EU's legal texts are outlined below, serving as a useful tool to CSOs in discussions with officials when raising issues, demands, or recommendations:

1) **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 208:** "Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. ... **Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.** The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries".

2) **Treaty on European Union, Article 3.5:** "In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute **to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth,** solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, **free and fair trade,** eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter".

3) **Treaty on European Union, Article 21.2:** "The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:

- foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
- help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
- preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security;
- assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;
- promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance".

4) **The NDICI-GE Regulation:**

"(18) The EC should ensure that clear monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are in place in order to provide effective accountability and transparency in implementing the Union budget

(21) … at least 93 % of the funding under the Instrument should contribute to actions designed in such a way that they fulfil the criteria for ODA as established by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

(22) In order to ensure resources are provided to where the need is greatest, especially to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the countries in situations of fragility and conflict, the Instrument should contribute to the Union collective target of reaching between 0,15 and 0,20 % of the Union GNI as ODA to LDCs in the short term, and of reaching 0,20 % of GNI as ODA within the timeframe of the 2030 Agenda, **by supporting realistic, verifiable actions to meet this commitment,** on which progress should continue to be monitored and reported.

(32) The Union should seek the **most efficient use of available resources** in order to optimise the impact of its external action."

5) **The Regulation describes the mandate of the EFSD+ and External Action Guarantee, key financing tools of the Global Gateway**

"The EFSD+ shall in particular foster sustainable and inclusive economic, environmental and social development, transition into sustainable value-added economy and a stable investment environment. It shall also promote socio-economic and environmental resilience in partner countries with a particular focus on the eradication of poverty. The EFSD+ shall thus contribute to the reduction of socio-economic inequalities, sustainable and inclusive growth, climate change adaptation and mitigation, environmental protection and management, the creation of decent jobs on the basis of the core ILO labour standards, economic opportunities, skills and entrepreneurship, socio-economic sectors, including social enterprises and cooperatives, SMEs, sustainable connectivity, the support to vulnerable groups, the promotion of human rights, gender equality and the empowerment of women and young people, as well as addressing specific socio-economic root causes of irregular migration and root causes of forced displacement [...].

The External Action Guarantee shall support financing and investment operations which …

- (d) are technically viable and are sustainable from an environmental and social point of view and maximise development impact;
- (e) do not distort markets in partner countries and regions and do not compete unfairly with local actors;"

6) EU Charter on Fundamental Rights: Includes rights such as a right of collective bargaining and action, fair and just working conditions, or environmental protection. Full list can be accessed **here**.

3.2.2 European Court of Auditors findings

In its opinion published in December 2024 (**Opinion 03/2024 accompanying the EC evaluation of the External Action Guarantee [COM(2024) 208]**), the European Court of Auditors (the Court) found major shortcomings regarding the EU's External Action Guarantee – used in the EFSD+, the EU's main financial tool of the Global Gateway.

This is a major blow to the EC's claims about the success of the Global Gateway. It presents advocacy opportunities to ensure the EC's transparency and fulfilment of obligations to contribute to the EU's development objectives, to improve engagement with civil society, and to use the evidence (existing, as well as what remains to be disclosed by the EC) to highlight why this approach centred at derisking and mobilising private funds is not working.

Namely, 7 major points of criticism of the Court are highlighted as follows:

1. **The Court highlights lack of evidence of the EFSD+' contribution to NDICI-GE Regulation objectives and points out a lack of an actual assessment to validate EC's claims of such contribution.**
   - The Court stresses that the EC evaluation lacks information on achieved results and that the EC did not make use of all information that was publicly available at the time the EC prepared the evaluation.

2. **Slow implementation: according to the Court, DFIs signed only 7.9 b € of investment operations (20%);** under Open Architecture, only about 10% of the envisaged amount was concluded under guarantee agreements (1.3 bn EUR).

3. **Questionable additionality: the Court says the EC did not carry out a proper evaluation of additionality as per the Regulation.**
   - The Court also finds that the EIB had 7.1 b € of operations signed, but a third of these were signed before the guarantee agreement was concluded with EC in April 2022 (over 2.3 bn € from 2019-21), later transferred under EFSD+. This highlights that the EIB could have funded these projects without the EU guarantee.

4. **Questionable ability to mobilise additional investments: the Court questions whether 'the estimates put forward by the evaluation are realistic' in terms of how much private sector investments can be mobilised by EFSD+.**
   - The Court notes the issues with EC's lack of methodology, and recommends measuring the actual leverage effect – which the EC didn't do – in line with international rules and practices, such as those under OECD.

5. **The Court highlights issues in guarantee pricing:** Guarantees set the fees DFIs are required to pay and there are rates at which fees are payable; they come on top of the fees added by DFIs on top of the EC's pricing. The evaluation reports DFIs' concerns regarding the pricing model: the EIB says that even small fees to guarantees eventually cascade down to financial intermediaries and beneficiaries.

6. **Questionable coverage of LDCs, heavily indebted, fragile and conflict context countries: the Court notes that the evaluation doesn't say how much funding under EFSD+ has been directed to these countries,** despite the Regulation stating these countries should be given special attention.

7. **The Court significantly criticises the EC's lack of transparency,** noting it does not report publicly on all aspects required by the legislation:
   - The Court notes that the Regulation requires the EC to publish NDICI-funded actions, including though a comprehensive single website, which should include info on financing and investment operations, essential elements of all External Action Guarantee (EAG) agreements, including info on legal identity of eligible counterparts, expected development benefits, and complaints procedures; the website has to have a complaints mechanism reference to counterparts, and could provide possibility to submit complaints to the EC directly;
   - The Court stresses that there is no 'investment operations' information as required published on EFSD+ website;
   - The EC's annual report doesn't include detailed reporting on financing and investment operations, but detailed annual reporting is also supposed to cover objectives, additionality, and leverage effect achieved;
   - No meeting minutes of EFSD+ Strategic Board are published.

Finally, the Court provides several recommendations on those issues, including:

- Evaluation dedicated specifically to EAG;
- When identifying lessons learned and preparing legislative proposals for the post-2027 MFF, the EC should consider assessing the elements of the EAG that were not covered by the current evaluation;
- The EC should consider improving the EFSD+ website and publishing all the information required by the NDICI-GE Regulation;
- The EC should consider how the proposals of the external study can feed into the preparation of new MFF legislative proposals, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries where conditions are unsuitable for guarantees, and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society.

3.2.3 Zoom-in: EP Hearing with new Commissioner Jozef Síkela – key points for a follow-up

The new Commissioner for International Partnerships, Mr. Jozef Síkela, had a confirmation hearing in the EP (where the Greens abstained from confirming him based on unsatisfactory answers). Síkela – a former banker and Industry Minister of the Czech Republic – made a number of commitments as well as problematic statements. It is a useful reference for upcoming advocacy needs.

The section below outlines key comments he made on different topics relevant to the Global Gateway, and highlights opportunities for advocacy.

- **On civil society engagement:**

Síkela underlined the need for civil society organisations (CSOs) to be involved in both the planning and implementation of Global Gateway projects. He acknowledged the importance of closer cooperation with local authorities and civil society institutions and committed to advancing dialogue with CSOs.

This provides a concrete entry point to advocate for more meaningful and structured CSO engagement, particularly at the local level. These commitments can be leveraged to push for systematic inclusion of civil society through spaces such as EU Delegations.

- **On assessments and monitoring:**

The Commissioner recognised that social, environmental, and economic impact studies are essential to determine whether Global Gateway objectives are realistic. He affirmed the need for permanent monitoring and reiterated the EC's commitment to measuring, evaluating, and auditing its actions. Síkela also showed openness to improving the current measurement systems and expressed interest in working with the EP to strengthen impact assessment tools.

These statements open the door for advocacy around better evaluation methodologies and stronger oversight mechanisms of projects. Civil society can propose concrete tools for impact assessment and insist that development finance institutions also be held to high assessment standards.

- **On transparency:**

Síkela agreed that transparency and reporting are important, provided that EU strategic interests are not compromised. He committed to exploring the appropriate level of detail and granularity in public reporting.

This acknowledgment creates an opening to demand greater transparency in Global Gateway projects, with clear expectations about what should be made public. CSOs can use this to push for timely and meaningful access to information without undermining security considerations.

- **On procurement:**

In discussing procurement practices, Síkela noted that some Chinese companies involved in Global Gateway projects perform worse than local suppliers and criticised the idea that the lowest price should be the sole criterion. This creates space to advocate for better procurement criteria, and it also aligns with the **programme** of the Polish presidency of the Council's Foreign Affairs working party to work on 'strategic procurement' for the Global Gateway.

- **On local added value:**

The Commissioner stressed the importance of generating local added value, including the local production of components and job creation. He mentioned plans to coordinate with the Commissioner for Trade to further this objective.

This offers a key advocacy angle: to follow up on how the EU is promoting local productive sector development and value chain participation in partner countries.

- **On Rwanda and Human Rights:**

Addressing concerns around Rwanda, Síkela stated that he will further investigate and in cases where human rights violations are confirmed, he would bring the matter to the College and consider measures such as amending existing agreements.

This commitment can be used by civil society to apply pressure in specific cases and to provide evidence that demands a response.

- **On authoritarian regimes:**

Síkela argued that in contexts involving authoritarian regimes or political prisoners, or in fragile contexts, EU aid should be limited to the provision of basic needs and essential services, to prevent misuse of funds. This opens a space to advocate for stricter safeguards in Global Gateway engagements, ensuring that EU funding does not support or legitimise authoritarian regimes or repressive governments.

- **On the European Parliament:**

Finally, the Commissioner expressed a willingness to work closely with the EP through regular dialogue, committee meetings, and by involving MEPs in field missions to partner countries.

This represents a key opportunity to strengthen parliamentary oversight and to work with allies in the EP and to push them to demand for accountability on Global Gateway projects.

3.3 Advocacy targets

- **Primary advocacy targets – key actors in the GG governance and implementation:**

Actor	Role	Department/Names
European Commission	Overall steer Strategic guidance on implementation via Global Gateway board	Commission President Commissioners and staff in the following Directorates General: • International Partnerships (DG INTPA); • Trade and Economic Security (DG TRADE); • European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) which is now part of Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST) and Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA); • Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW)
European External Action Service	Overall steer	High Representative/Vice-President Staff EU delegations
Council	Political steer	• The Council's Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the EU (COREPER); • Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX); • Other relevant like Working Party on Development Cooperation and International Partnerships (CODEV-PI) or the Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM).
European Parliament	Global Gateway Board observer Observer on EFSD+ Board Budgetary powers Standing rapporteurs on the Global Gateway	Committees: • Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET); • Committee on Development (DEVE); • Committee on International Trade (INTA); • Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI); • Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT). Other relevant include Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).

Member States' ministries	Strategic guidance on implementation via Global Gateway board Implement national development cooperation objectives	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Development, Energy
Development banks	Strategic guidance on implementation via Global Gateway board as observers; Financing of projects	• European Investment Bank (EIB); • European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); • National Development Banks or institutions, e.g. KfW, AFD (**full list**, p.50); • European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) and International Multilateral Development Banks, e.g. WB, AfDB.
Export credit agencies	Financing of projects	E.g. Euler Hermes, BPIFrance, SACE, Credendo (**full list** p.33)
European courts and legal bodies	Accountability of the EC and other implementing actors of the Global Gateway	• Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); • European Ombudsman; • European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

- **Secondary advocacy targets (and allies):**

Actor	Role	Department/Names
Global Gateway Civil Society and Local Authorities Advisory Platform	Providing pushback on problematic Global Gateway projects and practices to the EC	**List of members**
Trade unions, Civil society organisations	Exposing poor involvement of local communities, social partners and civil society organisations in the Global Gateway's implementation Putting pressure on the EU institutions, providing information on impacts Sharing best practices and knowledge for implementation	EU and Member State-level Global South International
Media	Raising awareness about the Global Gateway, maximising pressure on the EU institutions	E.g. Politico, Euronews, The Guardian, Financial Times, EUobserver.
Think tanks	Raising awareness about the Global Gateway, researching impacts and numbers, lobbying EU institutions	E.g. ECDPM, FEPS, CEPS

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SOLIDAR is a European and worldwide network of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) working to advance social justice through a just transition in Europe and worldwide. Our over 50 member organisations are based in 27 countries (19 of which are EU countries) and include national CSOs in Europe, as non-EU, EU-wide and organisations active at the international level.

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