
POLICY BRIEF
November 2026

FEPS
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DOES THE GLOBAL GATEWAY DELIVER?

COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON THE MWACHE DAM



ABSTRACT

The following policy brief (case study) is an assessment of the Mwache Multi-Purpose Dam in Kenya's coastal region. It presents civil society perspectives gathered through consultations that used the Just Transition Scorecard as a guide. The Scorecard was developed to evaluate Global Gateway projects against three just transition dimensions: participation and governance, socioeconomic impacts, and environmental impacts. Besides civil society perspectives, the overall analysis is additionally informed by a combination of official documents, field research and stakeholders' reported evidence.

The case study seeks to identify how the project has impacted on the livelihoods of local communities, as well as the ecosystems it displaced. Furthermore, it explores the effect of the compensation and mitigation measures that were implemented.

The Mwache Dam project provides a test case for the just transition, given its detailed resettlement action plan (RAP) and environmental and social impact assessment commitments.

However, promises made regarding compensation and timelines, as well as financial oversight and independent verification of environmental commitments, have not been fulfilled. Most disputes between the project management team and the community have escalated to protests or to national parliament before being redressed or resolved. This is the clearest indication that project mechanisms are not producing intended results.

The Mwache Dam illustrates both the potential and the risks of large-scale infrastructure investments. While the project addresses a critical water deficit, its implementation has revealed significant shortcomings in compensation, livelihood restoration, community participation and environmental safeguards. The central lesson is that sound project design alone does not guarantee a just transition. For Mwache and future Global Gateway investments, the EU and its financing partners should prioritise independent monitoring, meaningful community participation, transparent grievance redress, and enforceable corrective action plans, working with national authorities to ensure that commitments translate into tangible benefits for affected communities.

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1. Background of the Global Gateway project: The Mwache Dam

Purpose and tool

The Mwache Multi-Purpose Dam (henceforth, Mwache Dam) in Kenya has received significant investment,[i] including €110 million from the European Investment Bank,[ii] and is listed as a Global Gateway project.[iii] This case study, prepared by Kenyan civil society, asks whether EU funding contributes to a "just transition": a shift towards a sustainable economy that advances social and environmental justice.

The case study is developed within the framework of "Strengthening the EU's Role in International Cooperation: Global Gateway and Beyond", a joint activity led by FEPS together with SOLIDAR, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Fondation Jean Jaurès. The study uses the Just Transition Scorecard, an online evaluation tool developed to assess Global Gateway projects, to help civil society gather ground-level evidence and support the development of demands towards the EU Delegations and other Global Gateway stakeholders.

Context of Mwache Dam[iv, v],

The Mwache Dam infrastructure project has four objectives:

1. Increase bulk water supply to Mombasa and Kwale counties
2. Increase access to water and sanitation in Kwale County
3. Provide flood control/regulation of the Mwache river
4. Support irrigation of an area adjacent to the upper check dam (this has been scaled back)

For decades, Mombasa and towns in Kwale County have faced a chronic water deficit. Drinking water demand is roughly 200,000m³ per day against a supply of about 50,000m³, leading to a deficit of around 75%. Residents buy water from vendors at high prices, and droughts and population growth have made existing sources less reliable. The Mwache Dam was conceived as a flagship response under Kenya's Vision 2030,[vi] and later became an EU Global Gateway project. The goal was to give Mombasa and Kwale a climate resilient, long-term bulk water source rather than a stopgap. Economic constraints prevent Mombasa's ageing water network from being extended to distant sources. Mwache was the only viable option considered: water is captured and stored from the seasonal Mwache river, about 4km upstream of Mwache Creek, close enough for gravity-fed transmission to both Mombasa and Kwale County.

Description of Mwache Dam and its stakeholders[vii]

The Mwache Multi-Purpose Dam aims to enhance water supply to Mombasa and Kwale and support irrigation. The integrated programme covers a 2,250km² catchment area and includes the main dam, check dams, a water treatment plant, pumping stations, transmission pipelines and distribution upgrades. On completion it is expected to supply 186,000m³ daily to over 1.6 million residents.[viii]

The main dam sits on the Mwache river in Fulugani village, Kinango sub-county, Kwale County, 22km west of Mombasa. The project area spans 20 villages, affecting 4,674 people directly. They belong to the Duruma ethnic group, which the World Bank's Indigenous Peoples Policy recognises as marginalised and vulnerable. Kwale County is also classed as vulnerable and marginalised under Kenya's Constitution.[ix]

The idea for the dam emerged in 2008. Construction began in March 2015, and completion has been delayed to November 2028. The project is financed by the World Bank/IDA, EIB and AFD under Global Gateway, and the Government of Kenya. The main contractor, the Chinese state-owned enterprise Sinohydro Corporation, has been involved since 2018.

How Mwache Dam became a Global Gateway project[x]

The project predates the establishment of the Global Gateway in 2021. World Bank/IDA financing for bulk water supply was approved in December 2014, and in 2018 Kenya signed a credit facility with the French development agency (AFD), which comprised the EU member state bilateral contribution. In 2021 the European Investment Bank (EIB) folded Mwache into Global Gateway as a climate adaptation investment.[xi]

Components are funded separately: the World Bank/IDA finances dam construction, the Government of Kenya handles land acquisition and compensation, and AFD and the EIB fund water treatment and distribution. This compartmentalisation insulated the EU from the most sensitive elements, particularly land compensation.

State of play in 2026

By August 2026 the main dam was over 90% complete,[xii] with water impoundment expected from October 2026. The project has survived changes of government, shifts in financing, construction delays and disputes over land and compensation. Between 2019 and 2022, start dates slipped repeatedly because of unresolved land and compensation issues, as well as the relocation of a bridge, a primary school, roads, graves and cultural shrines. From 2023 to 2024, disputes arose over the promised 70% local labour quota and compensation.[xiii] A 2025 World Bank technical review judged the upper check dam's irrigation function to be economically unviable because of high pumping costs, halting it while keeping its silt-detention role.[xiv] The same review flagged the absence of an internal audit function.[xv]

2. Methodology and stakeholder consultation process

This case summarises the views of seven civil society organisations, three community leaders and one local authority representative from the Mwache catchment area.[xvi] Consultations took place in August 2026 through group or individual conversations, using the Scorecard as a guide. All conversations were recorded with written consent, in line with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). A local group, the Muslim Women Advancement of Rights and Protection (MWARP), which was not itself consulted, helped identify relevant civil society actors. Human Rights Agenda (HURIA), active in Kinango sub-county where Mwache is located, held a focus group with its field staff, management and a trade union representative. Greenville Ecological and Resource Management offered a desk review of environmental aspects. Grassroots views came from a Fulugani village leader (downstream), a Duruma representative (upstream, also representing the Kwale County Civil Society Consortium and the Duruma Council of Elders), and the ward administrator's office. The team also toured the dam site, resettlement areas, Mwache creek and relocated facilities.

3. Scorecard findings and analysis across the three dimensions

The study assesses the Global Gateway project across three dimensions, based on the Just Transition Scorecard survey: 1. Participation and Governance; 2. Socioeconomic impact; 3. Environmental impact.

3.1 Participation and Governance

Participation by civil society and affected communities was perceived as largely cosmetic during both design and implementation. A Vulnerable and Marginalised Groups Plan was prepared under World Bank rules to protect affected communities from the Duruma group, but there was a significant gap between its objectives and what eventually unfolded on the ground.[xvii]

The main participation gaps flagged are:

- **Limited access to project information:**

"A lot of the people affected by the project are illiterate. As we are aware, most of this consultation was done in English, or rather, all the documents were available on the website and are very technical for the common community" (Local testimony)

Project documents were written in English, not translated into Kiswahili or Chiduruma, and were too technical for many affected people. This fostered disinformation, mistrust, and fuelled early confrontation. Insufficient, continuous engagement kept that mistrust alive into 2026. The irrigation component of the upper check dam was excluded from the project by the World Bank's March 2025 audit, yet local authorities (ward administration) were still unaware of this more than a year later.

- **Unfulfilled and delayed promises:** Implementers promised jobs for local youths and a tarmacked road.[xviii] Jobs went largely to young people from other counties, and the road was made from murram.[xix] Several respondents said land was given up on the strength of the jobs promise, which changed along the way.

"During the initial stages when community members were being asked by the government to surrender their farms for the Mwache project, they were told the project will employ nearly all the local youths in the community. And this is one of the reasons they agreed to give up their lands. But things changed along the way." (Local testimony)

- **Insufficient consultation and meaningful participation of civil society and communities**: According to one respondent,

"The communities and civil societies were not involved in designing this project. It is after the project was funded that the community was informed about it. At this point anything that was not good for the community could not be changed." The respondent also said: "The project … has largely left the local community as reactive spectators."

Consultations were chaotic, held too late, and many participants left before officials arrived. A consulting firm, Frontman, was hired to manage community relations. Respondents claimed the consultancy used divide-and-rule tactics and recruited supporters to pressure others. According to another respondent, the project management failed to ensure meaningful participation of civil society organisations (CSOs):

"The project regarded CSOs as adversarial and did everything to keep CSOs from interacting and engaging with how the project affected the community."

- Meanwhile, **consultations with local authorities were meaningful**: County leaders flagged that Kwale had been overlooked as a water beneficiary, and the design was revised to include a Kwale water component.

Grievance mechanisms

The project has a grievances and complaints redress mechanism that, for the most part, functions quite well. The National Land Commission reused a model from the Thwake Dam project: an Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism, provided for in the RAP under World Bank safeguards. It includes 27 committees (20 at the village level, five at the sub-location level, and one at the sub-county level), plus Community Liaison Committees.[xx] Community members submitted a series of grievances about schools not being built to specification, insufficient local hiring, unresolved land succession and documentation disputes, and delayed compensation. However, a Fulugani elder lamented that most committee members were compromised on account of receiving financial inducements in relation to the project, and instead of being aligned with their community's interests, were vulnerable to the influence of project representatives. He also felt that national administration officers

were seen as intimidating rather than neutral, and that the committee was constituted of "only two representatives from local administration and the consultancy, without anyone from civil society", and that it did not publish any reports.

Residents protested construction in 2024 over unpaid compensation, and succeeded in halting it. Parliament became the only effective means of redress for affected people. Local Members of Parliament demanded accountability and organised demonstrations. In August 2024 the National Assembly's Committee on Blue Economy, Water and Irrigation summoned the National Treasury, the National Land Commission and the State Department for Irrigation. The Treasury then released U$3.9 million, with a further U$3.9 million committed for affected households. By May 2025 about U$7.8 million of U$12.4 million in allocations had been paid, with the remainder scheduled for payment the following financial year. Delays persisted, and further protests followed.[xxi]

3.2 Socio-economic impact

The socio economic section of this report looks at what the project has taken from, or given to, local communities — through displacement, infrastructure, and jobs — and whether it provides genuine economic benefits to communities and the country.

Displacement and compensation: Displacement from building operations affected households whose livelihoods depended on farmland. However, resettlement was rushed because of earlier delays. Compensation was not uniform and depended largely on each person's knowledge of land matters and bargaining power. At Fulugani, a community leader disputed a government survey that reduced his land from nine acres to four acres. He, along with some 20 other households, had not relocated at the time of the assessment. Delays in disbursement of government funds triggered mass protests. Families had only 30 days after payment to find new land, often buying smaller, more expensive plots that could not support farming or income activities.[xxii] This irremediably impacted the community's way of life, identity, and social cohesion. As of August 2026, many households had still not received compensation from the National Land Commission. This prompted the area Woman Representative to organise protests against the slow pace and below-market valuations.

Loss of livelihood: It remains unclear whether economic benefits will reach affected communities. Resettled people lost their livelihoods, and the new land cannot meet basic needs. Delayed payments, below-market land compensation, and the lack of standard rules and criteria for determining compensation caused social strife and demonstrations. According to a respondent:

"The lingering feeling is that land compensation was never fair, and it differed from one location to another, with the Frontman company being accused of corruption and favouritism. There are currently efforts to start income generating projects for project-affected people such as fish farming and goat keeping, but this is moving very slowly."

Adaptive project design changed livelihood strategies. The upper check dam irrigation component, planned for between 1,000 and 7,000 acres, was scrapped in favour of farmer-led pilots.[xxiii] Respondents said it was the main reason the community accepted the dam, and that its loss leaves them feeling shortchanged, as irrigation is now planned far away.

"There was a promise that the local community would benefit from irrigation farming. What is emerging is that this will be done far away from Mwache Dam and certainly will not benefit the local displaced community." (Local testimony)

These findings are corroborated by an independent academic study published in 2026, based on interviews with 100 households displaced by the Mwache Dam. The study found a substantial deterioration in livelihood conditions following resettlement. Whereas 88% of surveyed households previously owned at least two acres of land, 86% owned less than one acre after resettlement.

The proportion of households earning less than KSh10,000 (€66) per month increased from 6% before displacement to 72% afterwards. The findings demonstrate that financial compensation and replacement housing did not necessarily translate into the restoration of productive assets, incomes and livelihoods.[xxiv]

On the other hand, relocation brought **new infrastructure**. By mid-2026 the relocation schools were over 95% complete, alongside a health dispensary, a police post and rehabilitated local roads.[xxv]

Labour-related issues and human rights: Public records and respondents agree that the project created entry-level jobs for over a thousand local workers, and local businesses supplied building materials. However, most of this work was low-skilled, casual and poorly paid, with no social protection or collective bargaining.

"The right of workers (those sourced locally) to join a trade union has been denied. The workers are employed on a temporary and casual basis, meaning pay is pegged to each day's work. There is never a guarantee that the same worker will be employed next month. The pay is also low, just enough to make ends meet. There have been numerous strikes to agitate against poor pay and terms of employment as well as employing other persons outside of the community." (Local testimony)

Public records state that 1,000 local workers are engaged, but the promised 70% local quota has not been met. After early disputes over pay, HURIA reported a sharp fall in local recruitment, as management accused local people of sabotaging the project. Respondents said trade union rights were denied, that workers were dismissed without explanation, and that strikes were common. HURIA and a local politician's aide reported that many workers came from other counties and that politicians and officers influenced hiring.

Macro-economic benefits: The project is ongoing, so most economic benefits remain projected. Optimistic analyses estimate a substantial fiscal stimulus before the dam is operational, and compensation payouts could spur local investment. The dam itself is presented as an economic revolution for Mombasa and Kwale counties through bulk water supply to homes and local industries, and is recognised as an initiative aligned with the Paris Agreement's goal of building climate-resilient water systems in cities.

3.3 Environmental impact

The dam has caused considerable environmental damage, especially to the Mwache river ecosystem. Reduced downstream flow affects livelihoods, wildlife, household use and the creek ecosystem. The Greenville Ecological and Resource Management consultant opined that disruption to the flow of sediment and other nutrients to the ocean may have a direct effect on coral and sea grass at the Diani beach, a major tourist attraction. The environmental organisation referenced the impact on biodiversity – for example, that indigenous coastal vegetation takes decades to regenerate, although plans are in place to replenish trees. Downstream, the dam wall has reduced flow rates, leaving fishermen without livelihoods and farmers and households without irrigation and domestic water.[xxvi] Clearing and erosion have left Fulugani village and its surroundings looking desolate.

"Mwache Dam project has hugely affected the communities living downstream. The dam wall has blocked water from flowing … Fishermen who depended on the Mwache river have found themselves without a source of livelihood, such as fishing and crop irrigation and water for domestic use, including for their animals. The death of natural river habitats has … disrupted or wiped out the ecosystem. Most of the trees that existed were cut to pave way for dam construction and therefore soil erosion is changing the landscape around Mwache. And the once beautiful Fulugani village and its margins looks like a barren land." (Local testimony)

All stakeholders named dust and noise as the top environmental concern. Blasting and rock crushing have covered Fulugani and Kasemeni in dust, and schoolchildren near the site have suffered most. HURIA said residents' right to a clean environment was not respected, and animals were killed by rock fragments. Blasting is reported to be cracking houses within 10km of the site.

4. Just transition assessment: Good practices and gaps in implementation

An approach based on just transition and social justice principles would have ensured that the Mwache Dam's benefits are fairly shared and that the marginalised Duruma people are not left behind. Through the assessment done with the Just Transition Scorecard, some good practices emerged, but so too did significant gaps.

1. Good practices

- **Alignment with national development priorities**: The EU invested in an existing Kenyan-led project, part of the Kenyan 2030 vision, thereby contributing to a nationally defined development agenda.

- **New livelihood opportunities**: Efforts are underway to restore livelihoods through fish farming, improved livestock breeding and household irrigation, along with jobs in environmental regeneration and tree-seedling production.

- **New social infrastructure**: New schools are replacing dilapidated classrooms that suffered from poor sanitation. A new hospital and an expanded police post at Kasemeni will also serve the community.

- **Better roads**: Local connectivity has improved with upgraded murram, though the promised tarmac did not materialise. The project has also disrupted the road between Mazeras/Kasemeni and Kinango town.

- **New and better houses**: Resettled households have moved into better modern homes with improved sanitation, albeit in smaller parcels of lands. However, land compensation payouts were considerably delayed.

- The initial project design overlooked Kwale County as a water beneficiary. Local administration leaders raised this fear and the project was redesigned to include a Kwale County water support component. **Consultation with local authorities** resolved a real inequity before construction commenced.

- The project has a fairly functional grievances and complaints redress mechanism. Furthermore, in accordance with World Bank rules, a **Vulnerable and Marginalised Groups Plan** was prepared to protect affected Duruma people from harm and ensure they benefit equitably from the project, and that they support it.[xxvii] Yet there was a significant gap between the policy's stated objectives and its implementation at the local level.

2. Gaps in implementation faced by the project

- **Protracted compensation and resettlement delays**: By August 2024, only KSh2.1 billion (approximately €13.8 million) of the estimated KSh4.5 billion (~€29.6 million) land acquisition budget had been transferred to the National Land Commission. Of the 4,674 project-affected persons, 2,589 (55%) had received compensation totalling KSh1.89 billion (~€12.5 million). Frustrated by delayed compensation and outstanding livelihood-restoration commitments, residents halted construction in July 2024. Although the government subsequently released additional compensation, disputes continued to delay the resumption of works.[xxviii]

- **Precarious jobs**: Young people did low-skilled, casual daily work for low pay, with no social protection and no collective bargaining. The lack of job security meant there was no certainty of re-employment the next day.

- **Mwache river flow alterations**: The river is seasonal, but it supplies silt and nutrients to mangroves and water to farmers. The project promised that 30% of overall dam water would be permanently let from the dam in order to sustain downstream flow. However, this flow will lack the sediment that estuary ecosystems need.[xxix]

- **Environmental and air pollution**: Blasting, rock crushing and heavy traffic created daily dust across a 5 km radius, with schoolchildren hit hardest. Water spraying near schools has helped, but dust still affects local communities.

- **Participation, transparency and accountability**: Consultations have surfaced significant gaps in transparency and accountability, ranging from inaccessible project documentation for project-affected people, ineffective communication and engagement activities, and lack of involvement of civil society organisations.

MAIN FINDINGS

Good practices	Gaps in implementation
Sound design on paper: Comprehensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), three-phase resettlement plan and a plan to protect the marginalised Duruma people	**Delivery lags behind design**: Compensation was delayed and uneven; only about half of the 4,674 affected people were paid by August 2024
Local consultation addressed an inequity: Local authority input led to a Kwale County water component being added before construction.	**Participation was largely cosmetic**: Documents not in local languages; communities and civil society consulted late or sidelined altogether.
New social infrastructure and homes: Schools (over 95% complete), a health facility, a police post, upgraded roads and better houses for resettled families.	**Livelihoods not restored**: Irrigation scrapped, 70% local jobs quota missed, precarious jobs, resettlement land too small.
A grievance structure exists: 27 dispute resolution committees were set up under the resettlement plan.	**Redress only came after pressure**: Committees lack independence and publish no reports; compensation payments resumed after protests, as well as a parliamentary and World Bank audits.
Environmental safeguards in place: A 30% downstream flow commitment and water spraying near schools to reduce dust.	**Environmental harm persists**: Dust and blasting (houses cracking), and reduced river flow and sediment affecting fishers, farmers and the coast.

5. Actionable recommendations:

This case provides **lessons for future Global Gateway infrastructure projects**.

On **paper and design**, the Mwache Dam project took the parameters of a just transition seriously. The project looked at alleviating negative socio-economic impacts on communities as well as environmental impacts. It included strategies to generate jobs and new livelihoods for affected communities. It provided for new social infrastructure such as schools, health centres and police posts. The project undertook a comprehensive ESIA and had a detailed resettlement action plan divided into three phases and sub-phases that responded to community input, as well as a project redesign that added a Kwale County-specific water component after its representatives pointed out the inequity. It also planned for a three-tier grievance redress mechanism right from the village to the sub-county level. At the design level, the project appeared to take into account the needs and interests of both people and ecosystems throughout its implementation.

The recommendations below are organised into two sections. First, we set out corrective measures for the Mwache Dam project as it stands today. Second, we draw on the Mwache experience to propose general recommendations for future Global Gateway projects.

1. Corrective actions for the Mwache Dam project

The **Government of Kenya** (Ministry of Water, Sanitation and Irrigation, National Land Commission and National Treasury) should:

- Settle all outstanding compensation without further delay, in line with a public payment schedule, and ensure that compensation enables households to restore their livelihoods
- Commission an independent review of disputed valuations and ownership cases
- Honour the commitments made on local employment quotas, livelihood measures and access roads, and formally consult affected communities on any proposed change

The **Kwale County Government** should strengthen local monitoring and serve as an accessible counterpart for affected communities, with particular attention to resettled households.

The **National Assembly and elected representatives** should maintain scrutiny until all commitments are delivered, through regular hearings and public reporting on compensation, safeguards and infrastructure completion.

The **project implementers** (the Ministry, KWSCRP, Sinohydro and consultants) should:

- Operationalise the safeguards, RAP commitments and existing grievance mechanisms including dust, blasting and noise controls, remedy for damage to houses, and monitoring of committed downstream flow
- Make the grievance system independent, accessible and trusted, with transparently chosen community representatives, published case and resolution data, and independent escalation for unresolved complaints

The **European Commission, EIB, AFD, World Bank and other project investors** should:

- Require a time-bound corrective action plan – independently verified and made public – that covers compensation, livelihoods, labour, environment, grievance redress and community participation.
- Enforce compliance through financing and safeguards rather than paper commitments. Where regulators are weak, support independent reviews and parliamentary and civil society oversight.

The **European Union Delegation to Kenya** should convene regular dialogue between government, investors, implementing agencies, affected communities, trade unions and CSOs to review progress on compensation, livelihoods, labour, safeguards and grievance redress.

An independent Mwache community monitoring mechanism should be established, bringing together representatives of project-affected persons, Duruma elders, women, youth, CSOs and technical experts. It should have access to project information, track commitments and grievances, and publish its findings in Kiswahili and in locally accessible formats.

2. Lessons learned for future Global Gateway projects

- **Transparency**: The EU Delegation, project implementers and other responsible actors should publish all the relevant documents and independent assessments for Global Gateway investments, translated into local languages and in locally accessible formats.
- **Project design**: Governments and implementers should make timely, publicly scheduled compensation a precondition for the start of construction. They should also design compensation around livelihood restoration from the outset, and establish an independent grievance mechanism before works begin.
- **Combine infrastructure investments with local development**: Increasingly, combine global gateway infrastructure with support for quality job creation, local industries, skills development, and technology transfer.
- **Enforcement**: Investors should secure compliance through financing conditions and safeguards rather than paper commitments. Where national regulators are weak, they should support independent reviews and strengthen parliamentary and civil society oversight.
- **Participation and oversight**: All actors should build regular multi-stakeholder dialogue and independent community monitoring into project design from the start, and legislatures should exercise oversight throughout the project cycle, not only after complaints arise. CSOs, local communities and trade unions should be involved from the outset of the project to ensure ownership and acceptance.
- **Strengthen evaluation mechanisms**: Support efforts to enhance local evaluation capacities to assess the socio-economic and environmental impacts of the projects.

6. List of stakeholders

Civil society organisations:

- HURIA, Kwale County Civil Society Consortium,
- Kasemeni Youth Forum,
- Muslim Women Advancement of Rights and Protection (MWARP),
- Kinango Human Rights Network, Greenville Ecological and Resource Management,
- Local Testimony

Community leaders:

- Fulugani village leader/elder,
- Secretary of the Council of Duruma Elders,
- Kasemeni ward administrator's office.

Other: Local Politician Assistant.

ENDNOTES

i The World Bank's revised total operation cost is US$490.8 million, as cited in World Bank (2026) Project Paper on a proposed additional credit in the amount of US$105 million to the Republic of Kenya for the Coastal Region Water Security and Climate Resilience Project (P145559). Report No. PPIAF000261. Washington, DC.

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xvi Full list is provided at the end of the study

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xviii A tarmacked road is a paved road surfaced with tarmacadam (commonly known as "tarmac"), which consists of crushed stone and aggregate bound together with a tar or bituminous binder.

xix Murram roads are a type of unpaved road made using laterite soil, commonly known as murram, which is commonly found in tropical regions. Murram road construction is done by compacting and grading layers of murram to form a durable road surface. These roads are mostly found in rural areas.

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At African Renaissance Trust, Matthias Brucker contributes to research and analysis, publications, policy dialogue and partnership building. African Renaissance serves as a think tank, advisory and implementation partner focused on continental governance. Working at the intersection of the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, Member States and non-state actors, it helps translate evidence into decisions, budgets and concrete action across Africa.

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